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The Unwelcome Judicial Obligation to Respect Politics in
Racial Gerrymandering Remedies

Jeffrey L. Fisher
INTRODUCTION
Like it or not, the attack on "bizarrely" shaped majority-minor
ity electoral districts is now firmly underway. Nearly four years
have passed since the Supreme Court first announced in Shaw v.
Reno1 that a state's redistricting plan that is "so extremely irregular
on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segre
gate the races for purposes of voting" may violate the Equal Protec
tion Clause.2 Such a district, the Court held, reinforces racial
stereotypes, carries us further from the goal of a political system in
which race no longer matters, and "threatens to undermine our sys
tem of representative democracy by signaling to elected officials
that they represent a particular racial group rather than their con
stituency as a whole."3 The Court shows no signs of reconsidering
this stance.4
Yet Shaw's constitutional harm is still often misunderstood.
claims are not reverse discrimination claims. In fact, the
Court took pains to emphasize that the harm caused by ra
cially gerrymandered5 districts was "analytically distinct" from the

Shaw
Shaw
1.
2.
3.
4.

509 U.S. 630 (1993).
509 U.S. at 642.
509 U.S. at 650; see also Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2486 (1995).
Although each of the Court's decisions in Shaw's line of cases has been by a five-to

four vote, even dissenting Justices recently conceded that "the Court seems settled in its
conclusion that racial gerrymandering claims such as these may be pursued." Bush v. Vera,
116 S. Ct. 1941, 1977 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer and Ginsburg, JJ.).
5. This Note uses the term "racial gerrymander" to refer to a gerrymander that is suffi
ciently bizarre and connected to race to trigger strict scrutiny. See infra text accompanying
notes 9, 24 (describing the Court's threshold in this respect).
The term "gerrymander" describes efforts to manipulate district lines in order to serve the
political or social goals of the architect of a redistricting plan. See generally Bernard
Grofman, Criteria for Redistricting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77, 99100 & n.94 (1985); Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness
as a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POLY. REV. 301,
301-04 (1991). The word pays homage to Elbridge Gerry, the late governor of Massachusetts,
who became famous for his ability to draw district lines that allowed Democrats to achieve
representation far in excess of their popular support. See David L. Anderson, Note, When
Restraint Requires Activism: Partisan Gerrymandering and the Status Quo Ante, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 1549, 1550-51 (1990). Such manipulation is probably as old as the Republic, but it is far
easier today with the assistance of computer programs that allow the user to appreciate in
stantly the partisan and racial effects of any given district-line change. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at
1953 (plurality opinion); Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 457 (E.D.N.C. 1994), revd., 116 S.
Ct. 1894 (1996); CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., REDISTRICTING IN nm 1990s xv, 11
1404
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previously recognized harms of vote dilution and malapportioned
districts.6 Even when a Shaw violation occurs, each citizen's vote is
still worth the same amount as every other citizen's; white voters do
not suffer because the district unfairly prevents them from electing
the representative of their choice. In other words, plaintiffs in Shaw
claims do not suffer any cognizable harm tied to election results,
but rather feel only the "expressive" injury of being subjected to a
racial classification in and of itself.7
Nonetheless, Shaw-type lawsuits have proliferated. Since the
Shaw decision, courts in several states have subjected to strict scru
tiny8 congressional districts in which race constituted the "dominant
and controlling" consideration9 and largely have struck them
down.10 During the past two years, the Supreme Court has struck
down majority-minority districts in Georgia,11 North Carolina,12

(1993); Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 106
YALE LJ. (forthcoming 1997); Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerryman
dering and Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 CoLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1381 (1987).
6. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 652; see also Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2485. For a description of vote
dilution and malapportionment claims, see infra text accompanying notes 33-36.
7. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 641; Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court's
Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 SuP. CT. REv. 245, 278-79 (1994).
8. In subjecting a voting district to strict scrutiny, courts first determine whether race
constituted the predominant motivating factor in drawing district Jines. See Miller, 115 S. Ct.
at 2486. If this is so, courts ascertain whether the state's excessive reliance on race was nar
rowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest, such as remedying past discrimination, see,
e.g., Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2490, or complying with the tenets of the Voting Rights Act's prohi
bition of vote dilution, see Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1970 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (indicating that
she is prepared to provide the fifth vote on the Court for this proposition); Diaz v. Silver, No.
CIV.A.95-CV-2591, 1997 WL 94175, at *36 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1997) (per curiam) (holding
that compliance with section 2 of the Voting Rights Act constitutes a compelling interest);
Moon v. Meadows, 952 F. Supp. 1141, 1149 (E.D. Va. 1997) (same). If the state does not
narrowly tailor the district to achieve such an interest, it is. unconstitutional. See, e.g., Miller,
115 S. Ct. at 2486.
9. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486.
10. Compare infra notes 11-17 and accompanying text with DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F.
Supp. 1409 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (upholding congressional districts against Shaw challenge), sum
marily affd., 115 S. Ct. 2637 (1995).
State legislative districts also have been subjected to Shaw challenges, and also have been
struck down. See Smith v. Beasley, 946 F. Supp. 1174 (D.S.C. 1996); Quilter v. Voinovich, 912
F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (per curiam), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2542 (1996). Neither of
these cases has reached the remedial stage; therefore, neither is discussed in this Note.
11. See Miller, 115 S. Ct. 2475.
12. See Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996) ("Shaw II").
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and Texas;13 lower courts also have struck down such districts in
Louisiana,14 New York,15 Florida,16 and Virginia.17
Now that courts staunchly have entered the thicket of racial ger
rymandering, they are beginning to face the difficult task of provid
ing appropriate remedies. Principles of federalism and separation
of powers initially require federal courts to afford states a meaning
ful opportunity to cure defective districts by adopting new redis
tricting plans.18 Yet once federal courts have interjected themselves
into states' redistricting controversies, many states have found
themselves too politically paralyzed, or politically unwilling, to en
act remedial plans - thus defaulting this duty back to the federal
courts.19
These courts are then faced with a thorny question: What prin
ciples should guide federal courts in redrawing racially gerry
mandered districts? It is well settled that federal courts charged
with the "unwelcome obligation" of curing a redistricting violation
must alter the state's original plan only as necessary to cure the
constitutional defect20 while deferring, as much as possible, to all

13. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. 1941. Additionally, the Supreme Court recently vacated and
remanded a three-judge panel's decision upholding the constitutionality of a majority
Hispanic district in Illinois. See King v. Illinois Bd. of Elections, 117 S. Ct. 429 (1996)
(mem.), summarily vacating and remanding No. 95-C-827, 1996 WL 130439 (N.D. Ill. March
15, 1996).
14. See Hays v. Louisiana, 936 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. La. 1996) (per curiam), appeals dis
missed as moot, 116 S. Ct. 2542 (1996).
15. See Diaz v. Silver, No. CIV.A.95-CV-2591, 1997 WL 94175 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1997)
(per curiam).
16. See Johnson v. Mortham, 926 F. Supp. 1460 (N.D. Fla. 1996).
17. See Moon v. Meadows, 952 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Va. 1997).
18. See, e.g., Grewe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586
(1964). Thus far, Florida is the only state to adopt successfully a redistricting plan to cure a
racial gerrymandering violation. See Johnson v. Mortham, No. TCA 94-40025-MMP, 1996
WL 297280 (N.D. Fla., May 31, 1996) (holding the state's reworked plan effectively cured the
Shaw violation at issue). The North Carolina General Assembly has until April 1, 1997, to
adopt such a remedial measure. See Shaw v. Hunt, Civ. A. No. 92-202-CIV-5-BR (E.D.N.C.
Aug. 8, 1996). The New York legislature has until July 30, 1997, to adopt a new plan. See
Diaz, 1997 WL 94175, at *39.
19. See Vera v. Bush, 933 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (mem.); Miller v. Johnson, 922 F.
Supp. 1556, 1559 (S.D. Ga. 1995), prob. juris. noted sub nom Abrams v. Johnson, 116 S. Ct.
1823 (1996). In Texas, for example, Republican governor George W. Bush, Jr. refused to call
the Democratic-controlled state legislature into session, apparently calculating that fellow
Republicans would be better served by a remedial plan drawn by the district court composed
of three Republican-appointed judges, one of whom, Circuit Judge Edith H. Jones, had previ
ously served as general counsel for the Texas Republican Party. See Vera, 933 F. Supp. at
1344; see also Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71
TEXAS L. REv. 1705, 1730-31 (1993) (discussing state political actors' incentives to stonewall,
and detailing maneuvering by Alabama's governor, in hopes of more favorable plans from
courts). In Louisiana, the court took the duty of redistricting upon itself after the state sub
mitted three consecutive plans that the court deemed unconstitutional. See Hays, 936 F.
Supp. at 372.
20. See, e.g., Upham v. Seamon 456 U.S. 37, 43 (1982) (per curiam); Connor v. Finch, 431
U.S. 407, 415 (1977).
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legitimate state policies - such as respecting traditional political
lines, protecting incumbents, and avoiding vote dilution - embod
ied in the original plan.21 Yet these seemingly straightforward di
rectives can dissolve quickly when federal courts attempt to apply
them to the "expressive harm"22 caused by a racial gerrymander.
The problem is that any attempt to cure Shaw's expressive harm
forces a court to redraw district lines, an action that imposes very
concrete consequences on a state's political landscape.23 To put the
conundrum succinctly: Just how far can a federal court go in affect
ing electoral outcomes when its purpose is to cure only appearances
and motivations?24
If the answer is to be judged by the actions of the first few fed
eral district courts to address the issue, the answer would appear to
be "pretty far." Despite the fact that Shaw injuries purport to have
nothing to do with electoral outcomes or partisan gerrymandering,
all three courts that have drafted congressional redistricting plans
as remedies for these racial gerrymandering violations have altered
dramatically the political landscape of the states at issue, in terms of
both trampling states' policies of protecting incumbents and alter
ing the partisan balance of states' congressional delegations. In
Texas, after striking down three districts as unconstitutional racial
gerrymanders,25 the court redrew thirteen districts - invalidating
already-held primaries in each of those districts - significantly al
tered the partisan balance in two of those districts, and moved two

21. See, e.g., White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795-97 (1973).
22. For an explanation of the nature of "expressive hanns" under Shaw, see infra text
accompanying notes 78-88.
23. As the Court itself has noted, "it requires no special genius to recognize the political
consequences of drawing a district line along one street rather than another." Gaffney v.
Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973); see also 412 U.S. at 753 ("The reality is that districting
inevitably has . . . substa. ntial political consequences."); Kristen Silverberg, Note, The Illegiti
macy of the Incumbent Gerrymander, 14 TEXAS L. REV. 913, 920-21 (1996) (highlighting the
relevance of district lines).
24. Decisions following Shaw have insisted that the constitutional violation at issue stems
from state legislatures' improper motivations (that is, their excessive reliance on race), a
violation of which bizarre appearance is relevant but not dispositive evidence. See Miller v.
Johnson, 115 S. a. 2475, 2486 (1995); Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1951-52 (1996) (plurality
opinion). Despite the Court's disclaimer, however, many commentators - and even some
members of the Court - contend that district appearance remains the driving force behind
the Court's decisions. See Bush, 116 S. a. at 1962 (plurality opinion) (holding that a dis
trict's bizarre shape "is not merely evidentially significant; it is part of the constitutional"
hann); Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647 ("[W]e believe that reapportionment is one area in which ap
pearances do matter."); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre
Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno,
92 MrcH. L. REV. 483, 536-40, 587 (1993) (arguing that district appearances must be the
starting point in evaluating Shaw claims); Pildes, supra note 5 (suggesting that the Court's
"predominant motive" test is destined to be reduced to an appearance-based test in order to
be administrable). In any event, a court can cure impennissible "motives" only by altering
their expressions or appearances.
25. See Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Tex. 1994), affd. sub nom. Bush, 116 S.
a. 1941.

1408

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 95:1404

primary winners into new districts.26 In Georgia, after striking
down one district, the district court redrew all eleven of the state's
districts, placed four incumbents in two districts - thereby creating
two open seats - and moved a fifth incumbent into a new district.27
In Louisiana, after striking down one district, the court redrew all
seven of the state's· districts, shifting decisively the partisan balance
in one district, and altering the majority-minority district so drasti
cally that its incumbent, Cleo Fields, decided that it would be futile
to run for re-election.2s
These striking results were caused, at least in part, because each
remedial court claimed to ignore all "political" considerations in its
redistricting plan.29 Granted, if political changes this drastic were

26. See Vera v. Bush, 933 F. Supp. at 1342, 1349 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (mem.) (noting, incor
rectly, that only one primary winner was moved). On the issue of the partisan shift and the
second dislocated primary winner, see Application for a Stay of the District Court's Reme
dial Order and/or for an Injunction Pending Appeal, Vera v. Bush, 933 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D.
Tex. 1996) No. H-94-0277 (hereinafter Texas Stay Application] (stating, before the November
1996 election, that the court's plan switched the Fifth and 1\venty-fifth Districts from slightly
Democratic to, based on 1994 statewide returns, 53.7% Republican and 52% Republican,
respectively). The shift in the Fifth District occurred precisely as predicted; Republican Pete
Sessions carried the open seat with 53% of the vote. See Results of Contests For the U.S.
House, District by District, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1996, at B19 (hereinafter Results of Contests].
In the Twenty-fifth District, Democrat Ken Bentsen, with the advantage of incumbency, pre
vailed in a runoff election. Some observers believed that unusual partisan voting patterns
critically aided Bentsen's victory when crossover voters from anti-abortion Republicans
abandoned the Republican candidate, Dolly Madison. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Something
for Both Sides in the Texas Runoffs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1996, at B22; Sam Howe Verhovek,
Republican Opposition to Party's Candidate Could Elect Democrat in Texas District, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 9, 1996, at A14.
At this point, I should note that several ideas in this Note stem from time I spent working
on the remedial phase of the Bush litigation, including the Stay Application cited above. In
that vein, I am especially thankful to Sam Hirsch, Don Verrilli, and Gerry Hebert for their
guidance and insights regarding many issues discussed herein.
27. See Johnson v. Miller, 922 F. Supp. 1556, 1563-68 (S.D. Ga. 1995), prob. juris. noted
sub nom Abrams v. Johnson, 116 S. Ct. 1823 (1996). The partisan balance of Georgia's
delegation remained unchanged in the 1996 elections, as all eleven incumbents won reelec
tion. See Results of Contests, supra note 26, at B18.
28. See Hays v. Louisiana, 936 F. Supp. 360, 371-72 (W.D. La. 1996) (per curiam)
(describing court-ordered plan), appeals dismissed as moot, 116 S. Ct. 2542 (1996); Kevin
Sack, Victory of5 Redistricted Blacks Recasts Gerrymandering Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23,
1996, at Al; compare House Membership in 104th Congress, 52 CoNG. Q. WKLY. REP 3299,
3299 (1994) (listing 1994 delegation) with Results of Contests, supra note 26, at B18 (showing
that the Fifth District, formerly the Fourth District, switched to the Republican column by a
58% - 42% margin). While Louisiana's statewide voting age population is more than 30%
African-American, the court reduced the African-American voting age population in the re
modeled district from 55% to 27%. See Cleo Fields & A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Why the
Anxiety When Blacks Seek Political Power?, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, July 23, 1996,
at Bl8.
29. See Vera, 933 F. Supp. at 1351 (claiming that incumbents "are entitled to little defer
ence in the process of redistricting" and that the court ignored the "partisan impact of its
actions"); Hays, 936 F. Supp. at 372 ("[The court's plan] ignore[s] all political considera
tions."); Johnson, 922 F. Supp. at 1564 n.10 (stating that incumbency protection was given less
weight than other factors because it is "inherently more political in nature"). Thus, it is very
difficult to credit the court with the stability of the partisan balance in the Georgia
delegation.
.
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unavoidable, regardless of the remedy chosen, these claims of neu
trality might have added legitimacy to the courts' remedies. But the
troubling aspect of these early decisions is that such excessive polit
ical changes did not need to take place; the courts chose to
subordinate states' express political redistricting policies to other
redistricting criteria, such as compactness and respect for natur�l
geographical boundaries.30 Even more unsettling is the fact that
the bulk of these critical alterations occurred in districts already de
clared constitutional, 31 and that, at least in Texas and Louisiana, the
partisan shifts consistently benefitted the same political party, the
Republicans. For some reason, these federal courts apparently
viewed the states' political considerations in the states' redistricting
plans as either not worthy of respect or beyond their institutional
reach.
This Note contends that neither of the courts' possible supposi
tions is accurate: if a state has expressed a policy of furthering iden
tifiable political ends through redistricting, then a federal court can
and should respect that policy when it remedies a Shaw violation in
that state's redistricting legislation. Part I of the Note defines the
expressive harm recognized in Shaw violations, emphasizing that
the injury this harm involves district appearances and racial classifi
cations, not electoral outcomes. Based on this harm, Part II de
scribes the principles that should guide courts in fashioning
remedies to Shaw claims. In particular, the second Part argues that,
if the state has sought to further political ends through its redistrict
ing plan, federal courts should strive to minimize alterations of the
state's political landscape. Part III examines the policy conse
quences of such a rule. It maintains that requiring courts to con
sider the political consequences of their decisions does not cause
courts to overstep institutional constraints on the federal judiciary.
Rather, it encourages courts to exercise judicial restraint in refusing
to alter unnecessarily a state's political status quo.
I.

THE HARM CAUSED BY RACIAL GERRYMANDERING

In order to fashion an appropriate remedy for racial gerryman
dering violations, one must first understand the Supreme Court's
concept of the harm to be cured. Therefore, this Part separates
Shaw's myths from its realities. Section I.A focuses the discussion
by straining out harms not implicated in Shaw violations. Section
I.B then surveys the Court's various attempts to define the real

30. See infra text accompanying notes 136, 141-46.
31. See, e.g., Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1345 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (explicitly uphold
ing the constitutionality of surrounding districts), affd. sub nom. Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941
(1996). In some other states, the constitutionality of surrounding districts was not even chal
lenged. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
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harm Shaw violations cause, and concludes that the only constitu
tional harm that concerns the entire Shaw majority is the appear
ance of a state classifying its citizens along racial lines.
A.

Harms Not Implicated by Shaw Violations

As a preliminary step toward productively examining the consti
tutional harm that Shaw seeks to address, two points must be made
clear at the outset: (1) Shaw claims are not vote-dilution claims;
and (2) Shaw claims are not partisan-gerrymandering claims.

1.

Vote Dilution

The Supreme Court has carefully emphasized that Shaw claims
are "analytically distinct" from vote-dilution claims.32 In the case
of racial vote dilution, plaintiffs, as members of a racial minority,
suffer the injury of having the strength of their votes systematically
"diluted" on a statewide basis as compared to members of the ma
jority group.33 In short, the state's plan harms the plaintiffs because
it prevents them from having equal opportunities to elect represent
atives of their choice.34 Similarly, in a malapportionment case, the
plaintiffs suffer the injury of having their vote diluted because there
are more people in their district than in another; thus, each of their
votes does not "count" as much as someone's in a district with
fewer people.35 These harms strike at the heart of what is consid
ered "the right to vote."36

32. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 652 (1993); see also Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2485.
33. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended, provides the basis for racial "vote
dilution" claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994). Section 2 is implicated when, for instance, a
state fails to draw a majority-minority district around a reasonably compact and politically
cohesive minority population large enough to form the majority of a district, see, e.g., Thorn
burg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), or when a state creates a multi-member district in an area
where racially polarized voting prevents the election of minority representatives, see, e.g.,
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
34. See Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1906 (1996) (construing 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)
(1994)); Gingles, 478 U.S. at 93 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (noting that "electo
ral success" is "the linchpin of vote dilution claims"); Pildes, supra note 5. In a very real
sense, then, vote-dilution claims are racial discrimination claims.
35. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983); Reynolds v. Sims. 377 U.S. 533 (1964);
Karlan, supra note 19, at 1717 (describing the injury in malapportionment cases).
The impulse behind Reynolds was a concern for something approximating proportional
representation. As Chief Justice Warren explained, "[I)t would seem reasonable that a ma
jority of the people of a State could elect a majority of that State's legislators." Reynolds, 377
U.S. at 565. This type of harm, however, clearly is not implicated in Shaw litigation. See infra
note 37 and accompanying text.
36. Cf. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555 ("The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's
choice is of the essence of a democratic society . . . ."); United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385,
386, 389 (1944) (noting that the right to vote protects against the diluting effect of ballot-box
stuffing); Karlan, supra note 7, at 248-49 (describing the "right to vote" as encompassing the
ability to participate in and, through aggregation. to affect the outcome of elections).
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Yet in Shaw cases, the "right to vote" - in other words, the
right to affect electoral outcomes - remains unaffected. In each of
the Shaw challenges brought to date, the percentage of congres
sional districts that were majority-white districts equalled or ex
ceeded the percentage of the state's white population.37 This point
is absolutely crucial: successful Shaw plaintiffs do not bear the
harm of enduring unfair or flawed election results due to discrimi
nation in the state's redistricting map.38 No one's vote is diluted;39
no one's vote counts more than anyone else's.40 As Professor
Pamela Karlan elaborates, in Shaw cases "[n]o one [is] denied the
ability to participate in congressional elections. No one's ability to
elect her preferred candidate [is] impaired. No allegations [are]
made that the plaintiffs ha[ve] been hindered in any way from par
ticipating fully in the governance process of reapportionment."41
Shaw injuries do not stem from unfair outcomes or unfair
processes; by simple logic, plaintiffs seeking the ability to partici
pate in a colorblind electoral process could not claim that their right
to vote has been impaired because there are too many blacks in
their district.42

2. Partisan Gerrymandering
It is equally clear that the Court views Shaw's harm as distinct
from the harm caused by partisan gerrymandering.43 Indeed, this
distinction is underscored by the fact that the very plans containing
the districts struck down by the Court in North Carolina44 and
37. In North Carolina, for example, whites - who accounted for 78% of the state's total
population - comprised the overwhelming majority in 10 of the state's 12 districts (83%).
See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 634-35; CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., supra note 5, at 549.
38. In other words, Shaw plaintiffs do not suffer because, in effect, the "wrong" person
was elected. See also infra section I.B.1 (showing that Shaw's harm is not related to the
representative elected from the district at issue).
39. Indeed, the plaintiffs in Shaw did not even assert that the state's redistricting plan
diluted their votes in any way. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 641.
40. For example, the redistricting plan struck down in Bush v. Vera achieved exact mathe
matical equality: every district contained precisely 566,217 people. See 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1979
n.10 (1996) ( Stevens, J., dissenting).
41. Karlan, supra note 7, at 286; see also Karlan, supra note 19, at 1736-37; Pildes &
Niemi, supra note 24, at 506, 514.
42. See Karlan, supra note 7, at 279. Despite the fact that, at one point, the Shaw Court
characterized the plaintiffs' claim as an alleged violation of their "right to participate in a
'color-blind' electoral process," see Shaw at 641-42, later opinions abandoned this characteri
zation and have demonstrated that Shaw's harm stems from the expression of racial classifi
cations, manifested primarily by the appearances of bizarre districts. See infra subsection
I.B.2.
43. At least Justice Stevens views the Court's logic as flawed on this point. He sees racial
gerrymanders as merely a subset of political gerrymanders. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1975 n.2,
1987-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, J J.); see also infra note 54.
44. Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
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Texas4s had been previously upheld under explicit, partisan
gerrymandering challenges.46
The Court applies an entirely separate doctrine to claims of par
tisan gerrymandering, articulated in Davis v. Bandemer. 47 Under
the Bandemer plurality's test, a redistricting plan constitutes an un
constitutional partisan gerrymander only if it "will consistently de
grade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the political
process as a whole."48 This standard is so difficult to satisfy that the
doctrine has proven to be completely without teeth.49 In effect, the
complaining political party must be entirely shut out of the political
process. And neither the Supreme Court nor any other court has
ever found that to have occurred in legislative districting.so
The Court's consistent judicial restraint in partisan gerryman
dering disputes is particularly important because it is firmly sup
ported by two of the five Justices who support the Shaw doctrine,
Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist. In fact, they would
prefer to make the doctrine absolute. Concurring in the judgment
in Bandemer, Justice O'Connor, joined by then-Justice Rehnquist,
would have held all claims of partisan gerrymandering non
justiciable.51 In their view, partisan redistricting is the essence of
politics; therefore, even if a redistricting plan clearly dilutes a polit
ical party's voting power, courts have no business interfering with

45. Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
46. See Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C.), summarily affd., 506 U.S. 801 (1992);
Terrazas v. Slagle, 789 F. Supp. 828, 834-35, 839 (W.D. Tex. 1991), summarily affd., 506 U.S.
801 (1992).
47. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
48. 478 U.S. at 132 (plurality opinion).
49. See Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of
Political Fairness, 71 TEXAS L. REv. 1643, 1671 (1993) (highlighting the weakness of the doc
trine); Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting is Different, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1201,
1208-09 (1996) (same).
50. See Issacharoff, supra note 49, at 1671 (The "partisan gerrymandering standard [has)
yet to be used by any court to invalidate any legislative action, [and) the Supreme Court also
threw its hands in the air when confronted with the most wanton political gerrymander of the
1980s: the infamous Burton gerrymander of California." (citing Anne Arundel County Re·
publican Cent. Comm. v. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 781 F. Supp. 394 (D. Md. 1991),
affd., 112 S. Ct. 2269 (1992); Republican Party v. Wilder, 774 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Va. 1991))).
In 1994, a federal district court granted a temporary injunction and later held that North
Carolina's districts for electing superior court judges violated Bandemer. The Fourth Circuit,
however, vacated the judgment and remanded the case in light of increased success by the
complaining party, the Republicans, in the 1994 elections. See Republican Party v. Hunt, No.
94-2410, 1996 WL 60439 (4th Cir. Feb. 12, 1996) (per curiam).
51. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 144-61 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). For schol
arly support of this view, see Larry Alexander, Lost in the Political Thicket, 41 FLA. L. REv.
563, 564 (1989) (asserting that, in Bandemer, the Court "indeed entered the political thicket,
a trackless wilderness best left unexplored"). See also id. at 564 n.9 (citing other commenta
tors holding similar views). For a persuasive argument in support of Bandemer, however, see
Dean Alfange, Jr., Gerrymandering and the Constitution: Into the Thorns of the Thicket at
Last, 1986 SuP. Cr. REV. 175, 177.
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the legitimate exercise of political power by the victorious party.52
For these two Justices, at least, expressly attempting to classify vot
ers according to political party - or, perhaps more accurately
stated, according to past voting practices - presents no constitu
tional harm.
But while politics and race often seem inescapably intertwined
- for example, statistics in Bush indicated that ninety-seven per
cent of blacks in Dallas voted Democratic53 - the five-member
Shaw majority continues to insist that racial gerrymandering is via
ble as a distinct, justiciable harm. The Court's tenacious adherence
to the idea that Shaw represents a distinct theory is especially sig
nifi.cant because plans like Texas's, North Carolina's, and New
York's could easily have been viewed as political gerrymanders.54
In each case, the state was required by the Voting Rights Act to
draw majority-minority districts.55 And in each case, the state could
have drawn more compact majority-minority districts. But instead,
Democratic-controlled legislatures spread out minority-Democratic
voters to avoid "packing"56 too many Democratic voters into al
ready "safe" majority-minority districts,57 thereby potentially cost
ing Democrats seats in surrounding districts that they controlled at
52. See 478 U.S. at 145 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
53. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1956 (plurality opinion); see also DAVID A. Bosms, REDIS
TRICTING AND REPRESENTATION: THE CREATION OF MAJORITY-MINORITY DISTRICI'S AND
TIIE EVOLVING pARTY SYSTEM IN TIIE SOUTH 46-47 (1995) (estimating that 91% of southern
African-Americans voted Democratic in the 1994 congressional elections).
54. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1957 (plurality opinion); Diaz v. Silver, No. CIV.A.95-CV2591, 1997 WL 94175, at *12-18, (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1997) (per curiam) (discussing political
motivations in adopting plan); Richard H. Pildes, The Politics of Race, 108 HARV. L. REv.
1359, 1389-90 (1995) (book review) (discussing North Carolina's plan). Indeed, Justice Ste
vens explained the Texas plan in exactly these terms. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1975 n.2, 198792 ( Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the Texas plan should be upheld because it was pre
dominately a political, not racial, gerrymander). Yet at the same time, Justice Stevens called
for a more stringent application of the political gerrymandering doctrine. See Bush, 116 S.
Ct. at 1975 n.2. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "evils of political gerrymandering
should be confronted directly, rather than through the race-specific approach that the Court
has taken in recent years").
Several commentators also contend that stepping up the political gerrymandering doc
trine will more forthrightly and effectively deal with racial gerrymandering than does the
Shaw doctrine. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, No Place of Partisan Ger
rymandering, T EX. LAW., Aug. 5, 1996, at 25. Briefly stated, these commentators maintain
that because race and politics are so intermingled, "address[ing] the aspect of race alone is
both artificial and unduly explosive." Id. In effect, then, the Court's recent decisions really
only unveil a subset of partisan gerrymandering. "Rather than polarized debates over race,"
these commentators contend, "we ought to focus on getting rid of political gerrymandering
altogether." Id.
55. See supra note 33 (describing the requirements of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act).
56. Roughly speaking, "packing" describes efforts to place into one district (or a few
districts) inefficiently high numbers of voters supporting a particular partisan interest,
thereby preventing these voters from altering election results in surrounding districts.
57. A "safe" district is one in which a particular political party has a comfortable majority
that essentially guarantees a victory in that district.
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the time.58 Nevertheless, the Court has determined that it can and
will strike down any plan that crosses the line dividing partisan ger
rymandering from racial gerrymandering - that is, whenever state
legislatures go so far as to use "race as a proxy" for voting pat
terns.59 Shaw is concerned only with harm caused by the latter.60
B.

Shaw's Real Harm

Having focused the discussion on Shaw's particular area of con
cern - racial gerrymanders that do not dilute votes - one may
proceed to identify the specific injury that Shaw seeks to remedy.
This section analyzes the two harms that the Court has discussed,
(1) "representative harms" and (2) "expressive harms," and con
cludes that only the latter properly encapsulates the Court's view of
the constitutional harm that Shaw seeks to redress.
1. Representative Harms
The majority in Shaw wrote that racial gerrymanders
"threaten[ ] to undermine our system of representative democracy
by signaling to elected officials that they represent a particular ra
cial group rather than their constituency as a whole." 61 Such a
58. See Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 458, 465-66 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (describing the
prominence of partisan politics in North Carolina redistricting, including Republican admis
sions that increased numbers of majority-minority districts favored their interests), revd., 116
S. a. 1894 (1996); Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 54, at 25; Timothy G. O'Rourke, Shaw v.
Reno: The Shape of Things to Come, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 723, 756 (1995); Pildes, supra note 54,
at 1389-90. Partisan manipulation also played a role - though not as overpowering a role in drafting Georgia's and Louisiana's plans that included unconstitutional districts. See Hays
v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188, 1201 (W.D. La. 1993), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994); Laugh
lin McDonald, Can Minority Voting Rights Survive Miller v. Johnson, 1 MlcH. J. RACE & L.
119, 146 (1996) (describing Georgia's plan). Incumbency protection was also employed ex
tensively in all of these plans. See infra note 141.
59. See Bush, 116 S. a. at 1961-62 (plurality opinion) (striking down districts because
"the bizarre shaping and noncompactness of these districts were predominantly attributable
to racial, not political, manipulation"); cf. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 160-61 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (advocating a doctrine under which partisan gerry
mandering claims are nonjusticiable, but maintaining that "[r]acial gerrymandering claims
should remain justiciable, for the hanns it engenders run counter to the central thrust of the
Fourteenth Amendment"). What makes race different? For starters, race, unlike political
affiliation, is an immutable characteristic. Moreover, under our constitutional scheme, race
based classifications, unlike political classifications, are "inherently suspect and thus call for
the most exacting judicial examination . . . ." Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.), quoted in Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2482
(1995).
60. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1956 (plurality opinion) (holding that "[i]f district lines merely
correlate with race because they are drawn on the basis of political affiliation, which corre
lates with race, there is no racial classification to justify," and thus strict scrutiny does not
apply).
61. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 650 (1993); see also Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2487; Louisiana v.
Hays, 115 S. a. 2431, 2436 (1995); Shaw, 509 U.S. at 648 ("When a district obviously is
created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected offi
cials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members
of that group, rather than their constituency as a whole.").
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message might be pernicious, but, for three principal reasons, no
harm connected to the actual representation voters receive in
Shaw-type districts could be the real harm that Shaw seeks to
address.
First, representative harms would apply not only to the bizarrely
shaped majority-minority districts to which Shaw speaks, but also to
compact majority-minority districts created under the Voting Rights
Act - districts to which Shaw does not apply.62 Both types of dis
tricts are created with the same level of intent toward ensuring that
the given minority has an opportunity to elect a representative of its
choice. But while some members of the Court stand prepared to
strike down the Voting Rights Act for this very reason,63 at least
five Justices have stated unequivocally that majority-minority dis
tricts may be created when race does not subordinate other tradi
tional districting principles.64 If representative harms were truly the
thrust behind Shaw, the Court could not take this carefully articu
lated position. It practically would be forced to declare the Voting
Rights Act, and every district created under it, unconstitutional.
That the Court has explicitly shunned this drastic action suggests
that some other harm drives Shaw - a harm not present in com
pact, intentionally drawn, majority-minority districts.
Second, claiming that representatives will feel as though they
represent only the interests of the minority group assumes precisely
the "'demeaning notion"'65 that the Shaw majority says is imper
missible: "that members of the same racial group . . . share the
same political interests. "66 Moreover, even if the Court could
somehow avoid this pitfall, surely a state could not defend a Shaw
62. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1969 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that compliance with
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act constitutes a compelling state interest and therefore satis
fies strict scrutiny); Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 471 n.59 (noting that any claim regarding
representative harms is a "question for Congress concerning the remedial provisions of the
Voting Rights Act," but not for Shaw remedial courts); see also supra notes 8 & 33 (describ
ing the relationship between Shaw and the Voting Rights Act).
63. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1973-74 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment); Pildes, supra
note 5 (manuscript at 2 n.2) ("[T]here is reason to think that at least two, and as many as
four, Justices are likely to . . . find the results test of amended Section 2 [of the Voting Rights
Act] unconstitutional.").
64. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1961 (plurality opinion) ("The constitutional problem [with
race-conscious districting] arises only from the subordination of [traditional districting] prin
ciples to race."); 116 S. Ct. at 1951 (plurality opinion) ("Strict scrutiny does not apply . . . to
all cases of intentional creation of majority-minority districts." (citing DeWitt v. Wilson, 856
F. Supp. 1409 (E.D. Cal. 1994), summarily affd., 115 S. Ct. 2637 (1995))).
65. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2487 (quoting Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 636
(1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct.
2097 (1995)).
66. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647; see also Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2487; supra note 59 and accompa
nying text (noting the Court's denunciation of the use of race as a proxy for voting patterns).
Justice Stevens also has articulated this concern. See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2497-98 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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claim by pointing to evidence that, for instance, the Representative
of the district at issue actually furthered white voters' interests at
the expense of the African-American or Latino majority.67 Hinging
Shaw claims on a Representative's voting record would inject the
judiciary into the business of the political branches at an unprece
dented level, a level that the Court has demonstrated no previous
desire to attain.68
Third, even when the Court discusses representative harms, it
only mentions them as a possibility; such a speculative view of
harm, however, has never been enough to satisfy Article Ill's stand
ing requirement.69 Consider the following invocations: "[v]oters in
such districts may suffer the special representative harms racial clas
sifications can cause";70 "a racial gerrymander may exacerbate ...
patterns of racial-bloc voting";71 "elected officials are more likely
to represent only the members of [the majority] group."72 The
Court has found constitutional violations without ever saying that
any of these representative harms has actually occurred or will oc
cur. Thus, if the notion of representative harm has any force, it
must be only insofar as it adds to the injurious message that racially
gerrymandered districts convey - and not as part of any concrete
electoral consequences the districts actually cause. Alternatively
stated, Shaw plaintiffs are harmed when the intentional creation of
a bizarre majority-minority district expresses that its Representative
is more beholden to one racial group than another, but not through
any actual failure on the part of the plaintiffs' Representative to
.

.

.

67. See Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 471-72 & n.59 (recognizing that any claims regard
ing the quality of representation in challenged districts is irrelevant to the constitutionality of
the districts), revd. on other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
68. This conception of Shaw's injury would totally remove the harm from the intentions
of the gerrymandered district's drafters and from expressions of the district itself - the two
places where the Court has exclusively looked to determine liability. See supra note 24. It
would also require the Court to resolve a quintessentially "political question." To cite just
one other example, hinging Shaw's harm on voting records would produce extreme tension
with the plurality's statement in Bandemer (with which Justice O'Connor agreed in her con
currence) that "[a]n individual or a group of individuals who votes for a losing candidate is
usually deemed to be adequately represented by the winning candidate and to have as much
opportunity to influence that candidate as other voters in the district." 478 U.S. 109, 132
(1986) (plurality opinion); see 478 U.S. at 152-53 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)
(agreeing with this position).
69. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-64 (1992) (requiring dis
tinct and palpable, rather than hypothetical or speculative, injury to satisfy Article Ill's
standing requirement); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (same). As the Court has
explained in the context of the Shaw doctrine itself, "[o]nly those citizens able to allege injury
'as a direct result of having personally been denied equal treatment' may bring [an Equal
Protection] challenge." United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431, 2437 (1995) (quoting Allen,
468 U.S. at 755) (alteration in original).
70. Hays, 115 S. a. at 2436 (emphasis added).
71. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 648 (emphasis added).
72. 509 U.S. at 648 (emphasis added).
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protect their interests. Otherwise, every disgruntled constituency
within a district could press an equal protection claim.73
Perhaps recognizing these infirmities, the Court's recent opin
ions have virtually abandoned the idea of representative harms.
Tue Miller Court barely mentioned the notion,74 and in the follow
ing Term's cases, Bush7S and Shaw JJ,76 the Court failed even to
mention the concept. This abandonment has been a wise maneu
ver, for, as the following subsection demonstrates, the only harm
that Shaw may attempt to remedy stems from the message that bi
zarre districts convey, not from any inequities in representation that
they conceivably may cause.

2. Expressive Harms
Because Shaw is not directed toward curing any purportedly
harmful election results caused by racially gerrymandered districts,
the harm on which Shaw rests must flow solely from the drawing of
the districts themselves. Shaw, therefore, addresses an "expressive
harm" - the inherent harm that stems, in and of itself, from a state
subjecting its citizens to a racial classification without sufficient
justification.11
Tue idea of an expressive harm can be rather nebulous. Profes
sors Richard Pildes and Richard Niemi eloquently encapsulate the
concept:
An expressive harm is one that results from the ideas or attitudes
expressed through a governmental action, rather than from the more
tangible or material consequences the action brings about. On this
view, the meaning of a governmental action is just as important as

73. A close inspection of Hays reveals this distinction. Only after the Court held that
"the plaintiff has been denied equal treatment because of the legislature's reliance on racial
criteria, and therefore has standing to challenge the legislature's action," 115 S. Ct. at 2436,
did the Court address representative harms. This demonstrates that "the legislature's reli
ance on racial criteria" constituted the real harm through which the potential for, but not the
necessity of, representative harms was expressed.
74. See Samuel Issacharoff & Thomas C. Goldstein, Identifying the Harm in Racial Gerry
mandering Claims, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 47, 58-59 (1996) (noting that the Court in Miller
"only glancingly mentioned" representative harms); Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All
These Years: Voting Rights in the Post-Shaw Era, 26 CUMB. L. REv. 287, 288 (1996) (stating
that "Miller[] apparent[ly] abandon[ed]" the requirement that plaintiffs prove representative
harms).
75. 116 s. Ct. 1941 (1996).
76. 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
77. Recall that a state may classify its citizens by race if the classification is narrowly
tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest. See supra note 8 (listing such interests).
Equal protection forbids states only from "subordinat[ing] traditional districting principles to
race substantially more than is 'reasonably necessary.' " Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1961 (plurality
opinion). Thus, racially motivated district lines are apparently valid if they comport with the
requirements of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1961; supra note
8. But when section 2 has failed to require such a district, the Court has yet to uphold any
district subject to strict scrutiny.
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what that action does. Public policies can violate the Constitution not
only because they bring about concrete costs, but because the very
meaning they convey demonstrates inappropriate respect for relevant
public values.78

This is exactly the principle that drives Shaw. The Shaw doctrine
says that even though racial gerrymandering does not cause mate
rial injuries, the state violates the Constitution whenever it conveys
the message of classifying its citizens by race without a good reason
- especially in an area as sensitive as voting districts.
The Justices themselves now refer to Shaw's harm as an expres
sive harm,79 and other language in their opinions supports this view.
In Shaw itself, the Court worried about "[t]he message that such
districting sends,"80 the "perception" that racial classification "rein
forces,"81 and the "signal[s]" racially gerrymandered districts con
vey.82 Subsequent opinions established that this anxiety over the
message conveyed by the state's "racial classification" forms the es
sence of racial gerrymandering's harm.83 Simply put, the state's un
warranted and implied racial classification, in and of itself, is the
harm that Shaw seeks to remedy.84
Shaw and its progeny, therefore, hold that, because of the
threatening message they convey to a democracy based on equality,
78. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 24, at 506-07; see also id. at 507-10 (elaborating on this
idea).
79. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1964 (plurality opinion) ("the nature of the expressive harms
with which we are dealing . . . "); 116 S. Ct. at 2002 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Pildes &
Niemi, supra note 24, at 506-07).
80. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 648 (1993).
81. 509 U.S. at 647.
82. 509 U.S. at 650.
83. Shaw and its progeny are replete with references to the harms of "racial classifica
tions." See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1951 (plurality opinion) (emphasizing that a citizen must suffer
"racial classification" to bring Shaw claim); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1900 (1996) (focus
ing inquiry on "racial classification"); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2485 (1995) (re
jecting notion that "deliberate classification of voters on the basis of race" fails to state a
Shaw claim); United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431, 2433 (1995) (holding that plaintiffs must
be "subjected to a racial classification" to have standing under Shaw); 115 S. Ct. at 2437
(stating that "racial classification" is necessary to satisfy standing requirement); Shaw, 509
U.S. at 643 ("Classifications of citizens solely on the basis of race are by their very nature
odious to . . . equality." (quotation omitted)); 509 U.S. at 649-50 ("Classifying citizens by race
. . . threatens special harms that are not present in our vote-dilution cases."); 509 U.S. at 657
("Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society.").
84. See Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1175, 1184 n.35 (1996) ("[T ]he harm is, quite literally, the drawing of lines based on race."
(internal quotation omitted)); Issacharoff & Goldstein, supra note 74, at 62 (asserting that
both Justice O'Connor's and Justice Kennedy's opinions "tum[ ] on the dangers of racial
classifications"). Notably, this concept of a racial classification itself causing constitutional
harm also provides the basis for the Court's recent decisions regarding peremptory chal
lenges. See Katharine Inglis Butler, Affirmative Racial Gerrymandering: Rhetoric and Real
ity, 26 CuMB. L. REv. 313, 326-27 (1996) (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986);
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991)).
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even "benign"85 racial classifications in districting are unconstitu
tional when unsupported by a compelling justification.86 In the
words of Professor Butler:
The message is that the state believes that skin color matters more
than all other bases for shared political interest. . . . For voters of all
races it says that blacks have a greater community of representational
interest with other blacks hundreds of miles away than they have with
people in the community where they live and work.87

In the Court's eyes, a state's purposeful racial classification, ex
pressed by a bizarrely shaped racial gerrymander, signals differ
ences between the races to a degree that is incompatible with
America's goal of equality.88 Thus, even though Shaw-type racial
gerrymandering does not cause any electoral or representative
harms, its unjustified racial classification itself yields a constitu
tional harm that, in the Court's view, requires a remedy.

85. Here, "benign" means that the classification neither causes disparate impact (in the
form of vote dilution) nor constitutes any "racial slur." See United Jewish Orgs. of Williams
burgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165 (1977); see also supra section I.A.I.
86. For the Court, no piece of evidence is more convincing of an excessive use of race
than the bizarre shapes of the districts themselves. Though the Court has provided somewhat
contradictory messages as to whether shape is merely evidence of, or actually part of, the
harm, compare Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486 (bizarre shape is merely evidence of Shaw violation)
with Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1962 (plurality opinion) ("bizarre shape and noncompactness . . .
[are] not merely evidentially significant," they are "part of the constitutional [harm]"), no
single factor more pointedly represents the pernicious messages of racial redistricting.
87.

Butler, supra note 84, at 340.

88. Therefore, this direct classification present in Shaw cases seemingly distinguishes
Shaw claims from "citizen suits" claiming that the state has imposed a racial stigma, like the
one present in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), where the Court has refused to grant
standing to sue. Compare Hays, 115 S. Ct. at 2435-36 (discussing Allen) with Allen, 468 U.S.
at 766. Such a direct and explicit classification was absent in Allen, at least with respect to
the residents within Hays's purportedly unconstitutionally gerrymandered district. Arguably,
a direct racial classification signals differences between the races in a way that the indirect tax
inducement scheme in Allen did not, and in a way that a majority of the Court now stead
fastly refuses to accept. Cf. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996) (striking down
Colorado's Amendment 1\vo because it was "a classification [of gays and lesbians] under
taken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does not permit"); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2112-13 (1995) (holding that strict scrutiny applies
to all governmental classifications based on race).
Under Hays, only citizens residing in the allegedly unconstitutional district have standing
to sue. See 115 S. Ct. at 2436. Some commentators have questioned this restriction: If the
state's act of classification is the harm, why are only the people within the district classified?
See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 74, at 288; Pildes, supra note 5. The Court's response to this
concern has been less than satisfactory, but the most persuasive reply is probably that the
expressive harms from classification are most directly felt by residents of the district because
the bizarre district lines tell members of the racial minority that the state has used their skin
color as a proxy for their political interests, while signaling to whites in the district that their
presence "is just incidental [- that they] are just the 'filler people' needed to comply with
one-person/one-vote." Butler, supra note 84, at 340.
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REMEDY

The current Supreme Court has worked diligently to define nar
rowly the role of federal courts in crafting constitutional remedies.
As recently as last Term, the Court reaffirmed that well-established
"[p]rinciples of federalism and separation of powers impose strin
gent limitations on the equitable power of federal courts."89 Our
federal system requires that once a federal court has identified a
particular harm caused by state action, the federal court must limit
its remedy to the inadequacy that produced the plaintiff's injury.9o
Consequently, in the words of Justice O'Connor, the Court has con
sistently refused to give "federal courts a blank check to impose
unlimited remedies upon a constitutional violator."91
Nowhere do these principles of judicial restraint have more
force than in the context of redistricting. Therefore, this Part ar
gues that, in remedying Shaw violations, federal courts should strive
to alter the offensive district lines that express the Shaw harm with
out upsetting states' overall political compromises contained in
states' redistricting plans. Section II.A describes the Court's appli
cation of the doctrines of federalism and separation of powers to
redistricting, highlighting its emphasis on judicial restraint in reme
dying redistricting violations. Section II.B explains the importance
and legitimacy of states' political policies, namely, protecting in
cumbents and establishing a particular partisan balance, which
states often further through redistricting legislation. Section II.C
contends that the Court's principles of judicial restraint in remedy
ing faulty redistricting plans require federal courts to strive to pre
serve the essence of states' political policies in crafting remedial
plans that cure racial gerrymandering violations.
A.

General Principles

Since the federal courts' entry into the redistricting arena,92 the
Supreme Court consistently has advocated a policy of judicial re
straint in remedying redistricting violations. Drawing electoral dis
tricts is in many ways the quintessential act of state sovereignty; it
represents the ultimate interaction and compromise between a
89. Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2197 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring).
90. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2183; see also Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2186 {Thomas, J., concur
ring) ("[O]verreaching by a federal district court simply cannot be tolerated in our federal
system."); Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2049 (1995); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brink
man, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 280-82 (1977); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
91. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2058 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (commenting on the permissible
geographic scope of remedies in school desegregation cases).
92. This entry essentially began with Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). In Baker, the
Court held for the first time that a claim asserting that a state's apportionment scheme was
unfair presented a justiciable controversy under the Equal Protection Clause.
.

!
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state's political forces.93 Thus, redistricting is first and foremost a
privilege and duty of the states.94 Accordingly, the Court ordinarily
prohibits lower federal courts from ordering any remedy before giv
ing an implicated state a meaningful opportunity to cure the viola
tion.95 Only when a state defaults on its duty to cure does a federal
court assume the authority to order a new plan.96
Even when a state does abdicate its responsibility to redistrict,
the federal court exercising remedial authority must tread lightly.
Finding constitutional infirmity in one aspect of a state's plan does
not license a federal court to reconfigure other parts of the plan in a
way it considers more appropriate or even fairer.97 A long line of
cases culminating with White v. Weiser98 and Upham v. Seamon99
requires federal courts to implement remedial redistricting plans
that cure the discrete constitutional violation at issue while dis
rupting legitimate state policies as minimally as possible. 100 In other
words, federal courts must limit their "modifications of a state plan
. . . to those necessary to cure any constitutional . . . defect. "101 All
93. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1979 n.9 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting
that "the inherently political process of redistricting is as much at the core of state sover
eignty as any other"); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973) (terming redistricting
"the essential[ ] political process[ ] of the sovereign States"); Baker, 369 U.S. at 323-24
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
94. See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2488 (1995) ("It is well settled that 'reappor
tionment is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State.' " (quoting Chapman v. Meier,
420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975))); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 156 (1993) ("[I]t is the domain of
the States, and not the federal courts, to conduct apportionment in the first place.''); cf. Bush,
116 S. Ct. at 1960-61 (plurality opinion) (noting the "longstanding recognition of the impor
tance in our federal system of each State's sovereign interest in implementing its redistricting
plan").
95. See Voinovich, 507 U.S. at 156; Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993); Wise v.
Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978) (plurality opinion) (federal courts should defer to states
"whenever practicable"); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964).
96. See White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 794-95 (1973); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 586.
97. See Wise, 437 U.S. at 540-44 (plurality opinion) (holding, in the context of at-large
districts, that federal courts must follow legitimate state policies, even if they are "disfa
vored" by the judiciary); Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1987 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that
"[w]hile egregious political gerrymandering may not be particularly praiseworthy," it is suffi
ciently legitimate to allow district lines to avoid strict scrutiny); Alfange, supra note 51, at 203
(explaining that a legislature's political choices cannot be put aside because of a judicial pref
erence for a different policy goal).
98. 412 U.S. 783 (1973).
99. 456 U.S. 37 (1982) (per curiam).
100. See Upham, 456 U.S. at 43; Weiser, 412 U.S. at 795 (holding that a federal court
"should not pre-empt the legislative task nor 'intrude upon state policy any more than neces
sary.' " (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 160 (1971))); see also Sixty-seventh Minn.
State Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187, 202 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (noting that a federal
court "seeking to remedy an unconstitutional apportionment [must] right the constitutional
wrong while minimizing disturbance of legitimate state policies").
101. Upham, 456 U.S. at 43 (emphasis added).

1422

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 95:1404

other policies furthered by the state's plan must be deemed legiti
mate and, therefore, deserving of preservation.102
B. Political Considerations in Redistricting
Political considerations, in the form of partisan balancing103 and
incumbency protection, are usually paramount in a state's redis
tricting legislation.104 Indeed, it is doubtful that any single aspect of
a redistricting plan receives greater attention from most legisla
tors.10s Hence, when - as in Shaw cases - these political consid
erations do not constitute any part of the harm caused by a state's
plan, the remedial court10 6 is bound to respect them.107
102. See Weiser, 412 U.S. at 795 ("[W)henever adherence to state policy does not detract
from the requirements of the Federal Constitution, we hold that a district court should simi
larly honor state policies in the context of congressional reapportionment."); see also Karcher
v. Daggett, 466 U.S. 910, 916 (1984) (mem.) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[A] District Court
must defer to any state policies that are 'consistent with constitutional norms and . . . not
[themselves] vulnerable to legal challenge.' " (alteration in original) (quoting Weiser, 412
U.S. at 797)).
103. "Partisan balance," as the term is used in this Note, refers simply to the dispersion of
partisan majorities that the state legislature placed in congressional districts. It is not meant
to imply that the state legislature gave each political party a majority in a number of districts
proportionate to its statewide support.
104. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973) ("Politics and political considera
tions are inseparable from districting and apportionment.''). Admittedly, in a few states to
day this is not the case. Some states, like Iowa, have commissions draw their districts based
on purely apolitical criteria, such as compactness and contiguity. See IowA CooE ANN.
§§ 42.1-42.6 (West 1991). Political considerations, however, played a large part in each of the
plans that spurred Shaw cases thus far, see supra text accompanying notes 54-58, and it is
hard to imagine a Shaw claim arising in the absence of political gerrymandering of some sort.
105. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 147 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judg
ment) (highlighting the extreme importance of apportionment to legislators and political par
ties); infra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
106. Because some Shaw claims never reach the remedial stage in federal courts, this
Note uses the separate term "remedial court" to describe federal courts that are forced to
remedy Shaw violations in separate proceedings after states prove unable to enact a remedial
plan. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96.
107. This is especially true when a federal court is charged with the task of correcting one
or two districts in a plan that was recently enacted by the state's legislature. Such has been
the case in all Shaw violations to date. When a plan has become malapportioned because of
a new census (as happens at each new decade), and the federal court must draw a new plan
because the state has proven unable to do so, a federal court may have slightly more leeway
because the state polices embodied in the old plan are a bit more stale. See, e.g., Fletcher v.
Golder, No. 91-2314C(7), 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5894, at *33-*34 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 4, 1992)
(utilizing increased discretion in drafting plan where no legislatively adopted plan was before
the court). Nevertheless, a federal court should still recognize that, under principles of state
sovereignty, somewhat dated state policy still has far more authority than policy created by a
federal court.
In Georgia, the federal district court added yet another twist to attempts to measure the
bounds of federal authority in redistricting. There, the court attempted to avoid the con
straints of Upham and Weiser by claiming that influence applied by the U.S. Department of
Justice overcame the will of the Georgia legislature. See Johnson v. Miller, 922 F. Supp. 1556,
1560 (S.D. Ga. 1995), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Abrams v. Johnson, 116 S. Ct. 1823 (1996).
Nonetheless, the plan with the unconstitutional district eventually passed Georgia's legisla
tive process, and it is difficult to understand how a federal court, in creating its own plan,
could surmise more accurately the will of the state of Georgia.
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Of course, remedial courts are bound to respect all legitimate
state policies, 10s not just political ones. There will be instances,
then, when preserving political choices conflicts with furthering
other state policies. In these situations, federal courts should pay
close attention to the state's redistricting plan. If the state's plan
demonstrates that political considerations played a dominant force
in its drafting,109 courts remedying Shaw violations should give
those political choices at least as much respect as they regularly give
to other state policies.
1. Partisan Balance
As flatly stated by Justice White, "[t]he reality is that districting
inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political conse
quences. . . . [Those who redistrict] seek, through compromise and
otherwise, to achieve the political or other ends of the State."110
Make no mistake: under the winner-take-all system that districting
imposes, slightly altering district lines can have enormous - and
decisive - consequences on the outcomes of contested elections
and policy decisions.111 Robert Dixon described this precept well:
The key concept to grasp is that there are no neutral lines for legisla
tive districts. No matter how the lines are drawn - whether by a
ninth-grade civics class or a group of Ph.D.'s or a computer specialist
- every line drawn aligns partisans and interest blocs in a particular
way, unlike the alignment that would result from putting the line
somewhere else.112

Hence, it is nearly impossible to overstate the prevalence of parti
san politics in redistricting.113 State legislators invariably fight
108. See supra section II.A.
109. Courts could garner such evidence both from the plans' legislative histories and from
the political appearances and realities of the plans themselves.
110. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753-54 (1973); see also White v. Weiser, 412 U.S.
783, 795-96 (1973) ("Districting inevitably has sharp political impact and inevitably political
decisions must be made by those charged with the task.").
111. As the Court aptly summarized in Gaffney:
[I]t requires no special genius to recognize the political consequences of drawing a dis
trict line along one street rather than another. It is not only obvious, but absolutely
unavoidable, that the location and shape of districts may well determine the political
complexion of the area. District lines are rarely neutral phenomena. They can well
determine what district will be predominantly Democratic or predominantly Republi
can, or make a close race likely.
412 U.S. at 753; see also Alfange, supra note 51, at 211 ("Every line drawn on a map to define
a legislative district has a political significance - whether the person (or computer) drawing
the line knows it or not."); Polsby & Popper, supra note 5, at 351.
112. Congressional Anti-Gerrymandering Act of1979: Hearings on S. 596 Before the Sen
ate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 96th Cong. 212 (1979) (statement of Robert G.
Dixon, Jr., Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law).
113. As Justice Frankfurter explained, "in every strand of this complicated, intricate web
of values [present in redistricting] meet the contending forces of partisan politics." Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 324 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also Diaz v. Silver, No.
CIV.A.95-CV-2591, 1997 WL 94175, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1997) (per curiam) (evidencing
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tooth and nail to preserve favorable cores of existing districts114
while seeking to increase their political power elsewhere in the
state.115 It is highly doubtful that any other consideration more in
tensely commands redistricting legislators' attention.
The Court has held expressly that states' political decisions may
further legitimate state interests.11 6 To be sure, the Court has gone
further to sanction practices like the one in Gaffney v. Cummings,
where the legislature sought to give each political party control over
roughly its own proportionate share of districts, than it has ven
tured to sanction lawful partisan gerrymanders.117 Nevertheless,
the Court has stated clearly that when the state's policy fails to vio
late a federal right - as is the case in lawful partisan gerrymanders
- remedial courts are bound to defer to that policy.11s This re
quirement ensures that judicial remedies are "free from any taint of
arbitrariness or discrimination."119 Thus, the Court has warned
lower courts not "unnecessarily [to] put aside [states' political compredominance of partisan concerns in redistricting); Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Stein
berg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33
UCLA L. REv. 1, 8 (1985) (referring to redistricting as "a political life-or-death issue for
members" of a legislature).
114. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2483 (1995) (noting that Georgia has a
policy of attempting to preserve cores of existing districts); Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408,
467-69 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (describing North Carolina's efforts to maintain cores of existing
districts in drafting redistricting plan), revd., 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
115. Put candidly by Professor Issacharoff:
Redistricting . . . is . . . a nasty, brutish power grab.
•

•

•

. . . Even if no racial considerations were introduced, the "traditional practices" of
redistricting amount to an invitation to manipulate district lines to reward friends and
punish foes. What is key, and what reviewing courts have recognized uniformly, is that
the consequences of redistricting practices are fully predictable and that political actors
enter the redistricting battles with a clear agenda of partisan gain.
Samuel Issacharoff, Racial Gerrymandering in a Complex World: A Reply to Judge Sentelle,
45 CATI!'.. U. L. REV. 1257, 1258-59 (1996) (footnote omitted); see also Karlan, supra note 74,
at 302 (noting the prevalence of partisan and incumbency concerns in redistricting). Indeed,
in perhaps one of the more frank explanations of this practice, the State of Texas admitted
that the "only traditional districting principles that have ever operated [in Texas] are that
incumbents are protected and each party grabs as much as it can." State Appellant's Brief at
8, Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996) (Nos. 94-805, 94-806, 94-988).
116. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983) (preserving cores of prior districts
is a valid redistricting policy); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752-54 (1973) (respecting
political compromises regarding partisan balance); White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 791 (1973)
(respecting state policy of preserving core constituencies); Weiser, 412 U.S. at 796 (respecting
states' authority to make political decisions in redistricting).
117. See, e.g., Pildes & Niemi, supra note 24, at 581.
118. See supra section II.A. There exists reason to believe, moreover, that judicial defer
ence regarding partisan gerrymandering in particular is sound policy because "political gerry
mandering is a self-limiting enterprise . . . [that can] be checked or cured by the people or by
the parties themselves." Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 152 {1986) {O'Connor, J., concur
ring in judgment) (citation omitted).
119. Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964).
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promises] in the course of fashioning relief appropriate to rem
edy"120 an unconstitutional redistricting plan.
White v. Weiser is especially instructive in this regard, because in
that case the Court struck down the lower court's remedy based on
just this type of judicial overreaching. In an effort to remedy
Texas's malapportioned redistricting plan, the district court had
before it two proposed plans that effectively cured the malappor
tionment violation: Plan B and Plan C.121 Plan B adhered to the
basic configurations in the state's original plan, but adjusted district
lines where necessary to achieve greater population equality. 122
The district court, however, chose to implement remedial Plan C
because, despite the fact that it "ignored legislative districting pol
icy," Plan C's districts were "significantly more compact and contig
uous" than Plan B's districts.123 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that "[g]iven the alternatives, the court should not have im
posed Plan C, with its very different political impact, on the
State. "124
More than a decade later, in the context of asserting the non
justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims, Justice O'Connor
succinctly stated the principle underlying the Court's policy of judi
cial restraint in redistricting: "Federal courts [should not] attempt
to recreate the complex process of legislative apportionment in the
context of adversary litigation in order to reconcile the competing
claims of political, religious, ethnic, racial, occupational, and socio
economic groups."125 From Weiser to the present, the best path
that federal courts faced with the "unwelcome obligation"126 of re
districting can take is to respect all of a state's permissible political
compromises while following the preexisting district lines - as ex
pressions of those compromises - as closely as the Constitution
will allow.
120. Weiser, 412 U.S. at 796.
121. Both plans cured the malapportionment violation to essentially the same degree.
See Weiser, 412 U.S. at 786 nn.4-5.
122. See Weiser, 412 U.S. at 793-94.
123. See Weiser, 412 U.S. at 796.
124. Weiser, 412 U.S. at 796 (emphasis added).
125. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 147 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judg
ment). Other Justices agree with O'Connor's position. See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. a. 2475,
2500 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("District lines are drawn to accommodate a myriad of
factors - geographic, economic, historical, and political - and state legislatures, as arenas
of compromise and electoral accountability, are best positioned to mediate competing claims;
courts, with a mandate to adjudicate, are ill equipped for the task."); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 323-24 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (discussing the "extraordinary complexity" of
redistricting).
126. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977).
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2. Incumbency Protection

Closely related to the practice of balancing partisan interests in
redistricting are the well-known practices of protecting district
cores of, and avoiding contests between, incumbents. Though this
practice seems to some like an overt abuse of power,127 the Court
repeatedly has recognized that incumbency protection is a legiti
mate state policy.128
Whether or not one likes the practice, 129 protecting incumbents
does serve at least four independently valid state goals. First, it
promotes experience in the legislature and enhances the quality of
the state's representation in Congress.130 Second, bipartisan incum
bency protection promotes stability by preventing small swings in
the popular vote from having large effects on the composition of a
state's congressional delegation. 131 If every district had essentially
equal numbers of Republicans and Democrats, a narrow margin in
the popular vote could cause swings in a state's delegation far in
excess of the shift in voter preferences. By responding to this dan
ger, "[safe] districts provide assurance that particular points of view
will always be represented" in Congress.132 Third, because the in127. See, e.g., Silverberg, supra note 23, at 927-29 (arguing that political gerrymanders
undermine the legitimacy of our government and deny voters the right to cast a meaningful
vote). It is somewhat difficult, however, to discern any constitutional argument in
Silverberg's complaint. The right to cast a "meaningful" (as distinguished from an "equally
weighted") vote certainly has never been thought to be a constitutional right. Her concern
over the legitimacy of our government is well founded, but, under our federal system, it is
difficult for a federal court to say that this overcomes states' legitimate, self-serving reasons
for engaging in this practice. Perhaps this explains why the Supreme Court has declined
invitations to prevent incumbency protection.
128. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1954 (1996) (plurality opinion); Weiser, 412
U.S. at 797; see also Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 89 n.16 (1966); Burton v. Sheheen, 793
F. Supp. 1329, 1342 (D.S.C. 1992) (describing incumbency protection as "an important state
goal"); Pildes & Niemi, supra note 24, at 579.
Additionally, courts have interpreted Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, see supra text accompany
ing notes 47-50, as saying that courts should avoid placing more than one incumbent in a
district. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 24, at 579; Silverberg, supra note 23, at 934. But the
desirability of this interpretation has been questioned by some commentators. See, e.g., Is·
sacharoff, supra note 49, at 1672 (lamenting that "[t]he doctrine born of the desire to curb
self-serving manipulation of the process by incumbent powers has been transformed into a
constitutional guarantee of sinecure for the pre-existing power base of those incumbent
forces").
129. For a sampling of the arguments against incumbency protection, see Grofman, supra
note 5, at 115, and lssacharoff, supra note 49, at 1672 n.145.
130. See Alfange, supra note 51, at 226-27; Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Fair Criteria and Proce
dures for Establishing Legislative Districts, in REPRESENTATION AND

REDISTRICTINO lsSUES

7, 17 (Bernard Grofman et al. eds., 1982); Elizabeth Garrett, Term Limitations and the Myth
of the Citizen-Legislator, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 623, 674-77 (1996) (recognizing that "experi
ence appears to be the critical factor in developing the skills necessary for legislator effective
ness"); Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 113, at 45.
131. See DAVID BUTLER & BRUCE CAIN, CONORESSIONAL REDISTRICTINO: COMPARA·
TIVE AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 75-76 (1992); Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note
113, at 39-40.
132. Alfange, supra note 51, at 226.
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ternal rules of the House of Representatives put a substantial pre
mium on seniority for purposes of allocating power, continued
incumbency provides concrete benefits to the states of the favored
representatives.133 Fourth and finally, protecting incumbents safe
guards constituent-representative relationships that have been built
up over time.1 34 While reasonable minds can disagree on whether
these justifications should carry the day, it is extremely difficult to
maintain - and, therefore, the Supreme Court never has - that
states act impermissibly when they seek to protect incumbents to
further these goals.
C. Application to Shaw Remedies
When states seek to advance political choices regarding partisan
balance or incumbency protection through their redistricting plans
- which they nearly always do - federal courts remedying dis
crete Shaw violations within those plans should respect states'
choices. Because the harm caused by racial gerrymanders has noth
ing to do with partisan or incumbency-related effects of decisions
made by states,135 federal courts lack both the power and the au
thority to affect such state-enacted policies. They should strive to
alter only "racial" district lines, while affecting the state's political
choices as minimally as possible.136
It might seem rather obvious that federal courts cannot use
Shaw violations as an excuse to "remedy" perceived political ineq
uities in states' redistricting plans - especially when the plans have
been expressly upheld against partisan gerrymandering chal133. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1912 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISH
MENT 50-53 (1977); Garrett, supra note 130, at 662-65; cf. Alfange, supra note 51, at 226-27
{highlighting the importance of protecting incumbents with experience and seniority).
134. See LaComb v. Grawe, 541 F. Supp. 160, 165 n.3 (D. Minn. 1982); Grofman, supra
note 5, at 111; Silverberg, supra note 23, at 938.
135. See supra section I.A.
136. Of course, there will be times when remedial courts will be unable to avoid altering
the political balance of the state. All that this Note advocates is that courts implement a plan
that alters the state's political balance to the least extent possible while still curing the Shaw
violation. This seems a modest tenet. In Texas, however, a less politically disruptive plan was
dismissed in federal court without any finding that the plan inadequately cured the Shaw
violation at issue. See Vera v. Bush, 933 F. Supp. 1341, 1351 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (stating that the
Court began with the proposal submitted by the Lieutenant Governor and the Speaker of the
House - which remained largely true to the state's political choices - but then, without
finding that plan infirm, critically "adjusted the plan with an eye toward smoothing the
boundaries"). The Georgia court also rejected a less politically disruptive plan, but did so
under the somewhat dubious claim that that plan would have violated Shaw. See Brief Ami
cus Curiae of the Georgia Association of Black Elected Officials in Support of Appellants at
21-27, Abrams v. Johnson, 117 S. Ct. 605 (1997) (Nos. 95-1425, 95-1460), United States v.
Johnson, 117 S. Ct. 356 {1997) (No. 95-1460). The Louisiana court imposed its own plan, to
which there were no alternative proposals at that time. See Hays v. Louisiana, 936 F. Supp.
360, 372 {W.D. La.) (per curiam), appeals dismissed as moot, 116 S. Ct. 2542 (1996).
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lenges.131 But this principle of judicial restraint extends further.
Federal courts also should not be able to escape their duty to re
spect states' political choices by simply "blinding" themselves - in
order to avoid complaints of partisanship - to the political conse
quences of their remedial plans.13s Whether or not remedial courts
admit it, their plans will alter to some degree (the question is how
much) a state's political landscape in the most fundamental of ways.
Because of the enormous impact that the composition of districts
can have on a state's benefits and policies, redistricting represents a
federal court's intrusion into the state's political sovereignty at the
most basic level. In undertaking such a delicate task, should we not
ask more of federal courts than allowing, or requiring, them to "ig
nore"139 the consequences of their actions?140
Yet this is exactly the early trend demonstrated by the first three
courts to remedy Shaw claims. Virtually without explanation, these
courts ignored explicit state policies of protecting incumbents141
and preserving cores of existing districts,142 even altering the parti
san balance of two states' congressional delegations,143 in favor of
137. Texas's and North Carolina's plans had been upheld against such challenges. See
supra note 46 and accompanying text.

138. See Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964) (indicating that legislative remedial
plans should be "free from any taint of arbitrariness").
139. The remedial court in Louisiana used exactly this word. See Hays v. Louisiana, 839
F. Supp. 1188, 1196 (W.D. La. 1993). The Texas court "proceeded without respect to partisan
impact" and did "not evaluate[ ] the partisan impact of its actions." Vera, 933 F. Supp. at
1351 (mem.). The Georgia court gave political factors "less weight" than all other districting
criteria. See supra note 29.
140. Alternately stated, if the political considerations underlying a state's plan are legiti
mate, why should we allow a federal court to remove them from a remedial plan? As Profes
sor Alfange noted in the context of partisan gerrymandering, this would "remove politics
from politics. No more quixotic effort can be imagined." Alfange, supra note 51, at 212.
141. See Vera, 933 F. Supp. at 1351; Johnson v. Miller, 922 F. Supp. 1556, 1565 (S.D. Ga.
1995) (subordinating incumbency protection to other considerations}, prob. juris. noted sub
nom. Abrams v. Johnson, 116 S. Ct. 1823 (1996). In their plans, which were subsequently
struck down by the Court, Texas and Georgia explicitly had sought to protect incumbents in
redistricting. See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1956-57 (1996) (plurality opinion); Johnson v.
Miller, 929 F. Supp. 1529, 1535 n.14 (S.D. Ga. 1996) (noting that, in Georgia, incumbency
protection is a "traditional redistricting principle" that "figure[s] greatly in the drawing of a
[state legislative] district"); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2483 (1995). North Carolina's
and New York's invalid plans, now in the remedial stage, also sought aggressively to protect
incumbents. See Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 420, 473 (E.D.N.C. 1994), revd., 116 S. Ct.
1894 (1996); Diaz v. Silver, No. CIV.A.95-CV-2591, 1997 WL 94175, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 27,
1997); T. Alexander Alienikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing Con
stitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 588, 625 (1993).
142. See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2483 (observing that Georgia has a state policy of attempting
to preserve the cores of existing districts); Texas Stay Application supra note 26, at 21-22
(noting that nearly 1.5 million people were placed into new districts under the court-imposed
plan).
143. See supra notes 26, 28 and accompanying text (regarding the courts' redrawing of
district lines in Texas and Louisiana).
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drawing more compact districts and "smoothing boundaries"144 all despite the fact that the bizarre districts themselves demon
strated nothing if not that these states did not favor compactness
over political considerations.145 Further, these courts did this in the
face of far less politically disruptive plans.146 In point of fact, these
federal courts made conscious decisions to subordinate states' polit
ical concerns to other, more sterile, redistricting criteria.
In attempting to explain themselves, these Shaw remedial courts
might have pointed to other courts that have previously refused to
consider the political consequences of their remedial plans.147
Those situations, however, were decidedly different. Previous
courts that have ignored the political ramifications of their plans
were remedying vote-dilution and malapportionment claims, and 144. Vera, 933 F. Supp. at 1351. Knowing the relevant law, Georgia's remedial court at
least claimed to follow the state's "traditional" districting criteria. See Johnson, 929 F. Supp.
at 1564. But, in pretending that such criteria did not include political considerations, it is
somewhat difficult to understand exactly what the court meant. Perhaps it followed all tradi
tional and relevant redistricting criteria, except for political considerations, but that omission
is precisely the problem.
145. The courts' preference for "pretty" districts is all the more odd, considering that
compactness and like considerations are not constitutional requirements. See Shaw v. Reno,
509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (citing Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752 n.18 (1973)).
146. See supra note 136.
147. See Good v. Austin, 800 F. Supp. 557, 564 (E. & W.D. Mich. 1992) ("[T]he mainte
nance of the geographic and population cores of existing districts is a criterion designed pri
marily to protect incumbents. Criteria that are so laden with political considerations are
inappropriate, in our judgment, in the formulation of a judicial districting plan."); Emison v.
Growe, 782 F. Supp. 427, 445-46 (D. Minn. 1992) (developing a redistricting plan "without
regard to the residence of incumbents . . . [and] without regard to partisanship"), revd. on
other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 1075 (1993); Terrazas v. Slagle, 789 F. Supp. 828, 844 (W.D. Tex.
1991) ("[E]nsuring free and equal access to the ballot, not partisan considerations or the
protection of incumbents, is the sole focus of federal law in the area of redistricting and
reapportioning seats to legislative bodies."), summarily affd., 506 U.S. 801 (1992). But see
Dillard v. City of Greensboro, 1997 WL 96674, at *5-6 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 26, 1997) (adopting
the "prevailing view" that, in curing a section 2 violation, "incumbency protection is a legiti
mate factor, but one that is subordinate to [other] traditional districting criteria"); Buskey v.
Oliver, 574 F. Supp. 41, 43 (M.D. Ala. 1983) (regarding as an imperative protecting incum
bents in drawing a remedial plan); Lacomb v. Growe, 541 F. Supp. 160, 165 (D. Minn. 1982)
(recognizing that protecting incumbents justifies "minor adjustments in district lines" by
courts). None of the Shaw remedial courts cited any of these cases, though.
Perhaps the most convincing precedent on which a "blind" Shaw remedial court might
rely is the remedy from the malapportionment violation in Karcher v. Daggett, 466 U.S. 910
(1983) (mem.). The district court in Karcher, having two plans from which to choose its
remedy, imposed a plan on the state that significantly altered the partisan balance contained
in the original plan. Despite the fact that the unchosen plan had been truer to the political
choices in the original plan, the Supreme Court, three Justices dissenting, refused to stay the
remedial order. Notwithstanding the fact that the case did not receive full consideration by
the Court, however, this opinion far from supports utilizing the same practice in Shaw reme
dies. The plan that the Karcher district court adopted, despite its more severe political im
pact, (i) cured a malapportionment violation which tainted all of the state's districts and
potentially caused unfair electoral outcomes, and (ii) adjusted a partisan gerrymander that the
court viewed as constitutionally suspect - as compared to recent Shaw cases where the plans
at issue had already passed partisan gerrymandering challenges, see supra note 46 and accom
panying text. See 466 U.S. at 910-11.
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though one can debate whether or not this justified those courts'
blindfolding14s - these different harms cast their remedies in a de
cidedly different light. In those situations, the states' political deci
sions had yielded "unfair" outcomes; they had produced inequities
in voting which federal law refuses to allow.149 Thus, it could fairly
be said that the states' political considerations were not actually le
gitimate. Further, the vote-dilution violations infected either the
states' entire plans or large portions thereof,150 enhancing judicial
authority to alter district lines throughout the states.
These factors are not present in discrete Shaw violations.
Notwithstanding the expressive harm that the faulty district causes,
every voter enjoyed, and continues to enjoy, fair representation and
equal access to the ballot box. Moreover, every district except the
one or two culprits is entirely constitutional.151 By making one dis
crete mistake in drafting a redistricting plan - namely, excessively
relying on race in drawing some district lines - a state legislature
does not forfeit its right and duty to control the state's political pol
icy.152 Thus, remedial Shaw courts must view the states' prior polit148. Such a discussion is beyond the scope of this Note, which is limited to Sha111 reme
dies. The point here is that whether or not those courts' blindfolding was acceptable (some
thing that appears to be an open question, see supra note 147), such action is unacceptable in
Sha111 cases.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35 (describing the harms of vote dilution and
malapportionment). Professor Samuel Issacharoff essentially made this point while a student
in 1982, arguing that the Court should not leave the resolution of vote dilution to states'
political processes:
[S]uch deference is absurd on its face; the vindication of voting rights can hardly be
trusted to the very representatives whose election is the result of the alleged vote dilu
tion. If the Court is motivated by a genuine wish to encourage the political settlements
of the historic and ongoing effects of discrimination, it can do so only by first ensuring
that blacks have adequate access to the political process.
Note, Making the Violation Fit the Remedy: The Intent Standard and Equal Protection La111,
92 YALE LJ. 328, 346 (1982) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
150. When courts strike down congressional redistricting plans on vote·dilution grounds,
they typically strike down the plan as a whole, rather than striking down a particular district
as in Sha111 claims. Indeed, the very idea of congressional vote-dilution assumes that a minor
ity's voting power is unfairly diminished on a statewide, or at least a large-scale, basis. See
Karlan, supra note 7, at 250-51 (describing vote-dilution claims in terms of aggregating votes
on a statewide level). Thus, every district, or nearly every district, contributes to the redis
tricting violation. This distinguishes vote-dilution judgments from Sha111 decisions which
strike down only one or a small number of districts and uphold the rest. See, e.g., Vera v.
Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1345 (S.D. Tex. 1994), affd. sub nom. Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct.
1941 (1996).
151. Indeed, persons may challenge on racial gerrymandering grounds only the particular
district in which they reside. See United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995). Of course,
because unconstitutional districts share boundaries with constitutional ones, it is necessary to
alter the lines of constitutional districts in order to remedy the unconstitutional ones. But the
point is that Shaw remedial courts should strive to alter as few districts as possible. More
importantly, such a practice should be done with care not to disturb unnecessarily the polit·
ical considerations manifested in the constitutional districts. See supra note 31 and accompa
nying text.
152. This principle holds especially true when a federal court has decided to redistrict a
state because it is not practicable to allow the state legislature an opportunity to remedy the
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ical decisions as legitimate. Simply put, when a state's legitimate
political decisions are enacted through a lawful process, federal
courts remedying Shaw violations must respect, not ignore, the
political will of sovereign states.
Furthermore, even if federal courts could overlook allowable
state policies in order to preserve some notion of political neutral
ity, an additional concern exists. Even accepting for the moment
the dubious claim that courts can fully "blindfold" themselves to
the political consequences of their Shaw remedies,153 there is strong
reason to believe that blind Shaw remedies nonetheless almost al
ways will favor the same side of the partisan struggle: the Republi
cans. Ignoring states' political choices in order to preserve judicial
"neutrality" will, in fact, not yield neutral results at all.
In states like North Carolina, Texas, and Louisiana, bizarrely
shaped majority-minority districts are not necessary to create safe
minority districts, but "rather result from Democratic efforts to
limit the partisan effects of redistricting" in compliance with the
Voting Rights Act.154 When, in the 1990s round of redistricting, the
Voting Rights Act required certain state legislatures to create addi
tional majority-minority districts, Democrats preferred less com
pact districts because they more efficiently dispersed the large
numbers of dependably liberal voters that would be contained in
Shaw violation. See Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978) (plurality opinion) (explain

ing that federal courts should defer to states "whenever practicable"). But this idea still
holds force in the more common case: when, after having part of its original plan struck
down, a state is unable to pass a new plan and defaults the duty of redistricting back to the
federal court. Even then, the federal court should draw its plan based on the last duly-en
acted state plan. A simple analogy demonstrates that this makes sense. If, after a referee
disallows points in a game, the two sides suddenly disagree on the score, the equitable solu
tion is to go back to the last score on which the teams agreed, not to go back to zero-zero.
153. Many commentators have expressed serious doubts that this can be, or is ever, done.
See Alfange, supra note 51, at 206 (asserting that it is unlikely that the drafter of a plan would
not discover the partisan effects of her plan before implementation); Transcript, The Goldwa
ter Institute and the Federalist Society: Federalism and Judicial Mandates, 28 Aruz. ST. L.J. 17,
47 (1996) (comments of Professor Daniel Lowenstein, UCLA Law School) ("[I]f you believe
that federal judges go about deciding redistricting cases without regard to their own political
views and partisan preferences, there's a bridge in New York that I'd like to sell you."); see
also supra note 111. Such blindfolding seems especially dubious when practiced by local
district courts which have a substantial knowledge of the local politics and geography.
154. Pildes, supra note 54, at 1390; see also Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (not
ing that a "politically mindless approach may produce, whether intended or not, the most
grossly gerrymandered results"); supra text accompanying notes 54-58. Moreover, Demo
crats may favor less compact districts in general. Political science literature suggests that
drawing more compact districts favors Republicans over Democrats because dependable
Democratic voters tend to be more highly concentrated in cities, and therefore more suscep
tible to "packing." See, e.g., J. Morgan Kousser, Shaw v. Reno and the Real World of Redis
tricting and Representation, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 625, 637 n.47 (1995); Martin Shapiro,
Gerrymandering, Unfairness, and the Supreme Court, 33 UCLA L. REV. 227, 237-38 (1985).
Although some have questioned this finding as insufficiently supported, see, e.g., Polsby &
Popper, supra note 5, at 334-35, no one has offered any evidence to rebut its intuitive appeal.
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extremely compact majority-minority districts.155 This allowed the
Democrats to promote the reelection prospects of Democratic in
cumbents in districts adjacent to the majority-minority districts by
preserving the Democratic cores of those districts.1 56
Democratic-controlled state legislatures therefore typically fash
ion less compact districts to protect their political interests - yet
when they draw these bizarre lines according to race, a Shaw claim
results. (Republican-controlled legislatures faced with the same
Voting Rights Act requirement do not have this problem: they gen
erally seek, for equally partisan reasons, simply to pack all of the
minority and other dependably liberal voters into compact districts
- districts that typically splice the cores of preexisting Democratic
districts.157 But because the districts are compact, Republican legis
latures' equally partisan tactics and results evade Shaw litiga
tion. 158 ) Hence, the upshot is this: whenever remedial courts
randomly alter lines surrounding bizarrely shaped majority-minor
ity districts, common sense should tell the courts that, in curing ra
cial, not partisan, injuries, they are far more likely to be favoring
partisan Republican interests than Democratic interests. 159
That the consequences of courts' willful blindness are far from
random or unpredictable should give any equitable jurist pause, es
pecially when the partisan balance of the state's plan already falls
155. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 84, at 321; supra note 58 and accompanying text.
156. See Frank R. Parker, The Comtitutionality of Racial Redistricting: A Critique of
Shaw v. Reno, 3 D.C. L. REv. 1, 55-56 (1995); see also supra notes 58, 141.
157. Indeed, in the 1990s round of redistricting, the Republican National Committee
adopted a strategy "to create new majority-black districts and new, presumably Republican,
majority-white districts." Michael Kelly, Segregation Anxiety, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 20,
1995, at 46, 48; see also Laughlin McDonald, The Counterrevolution in Minority Voting
Rights, 65 Miss. L.J. 271, 292 & n.99 (1995) (reporting that the Republicans viewed the crea
tion of majority-minority districts as a way to pack traditionally Democratic voters and to
make the surrounding districts more vulnerable to Republican takeovers); supra notes 56,
154 (discussing such "packing").
158. Though Democrats controlled the state legislatures in each of the southern states
where additional majority-minority districts were created in the 1990s, see McDonald, supra
note 157, at 291, the creation of Alabama's Seventh Congressional District reflects this
Republican strategy. The 67.5% black district, drafted by a Republican state senator and
adopted by a three-judge panel composed of three Republican appointees, fortified
Republican-held districts and caused a partisan shift in the Sixth District. See CoNORES·
SIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., supra note 5, at 19; see also Tyler Whitley, Assembly Defends How
It Drew District, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 8, 1997, at A9 (noting that, in Virginia,
Republicans pushed for a single majority-minority district "with a large majority of blacks
because they figured that would enhance their chances in adjacent districts, which would be
whiter").
Recall that compact, majority-minority districts created under section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act do not violate Shaw. See supra note 8. In this instance, legislators explicitly pay
attention to race with impunity.
159. This describes in the most favorable light - that is, fully accepting the courts' state
ments that they were unaware of the political consequences of their plans - exactly what
happened in Texas and Louisiana, where each partisan shift favored the Republicans. See
supra notes 26, 28.
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within constitutional bounds.16° Yet some commentators argue that
even though blindly drawing more compact districts may favor
Republicans, this should not affect courts' remedial calculus.161 If
one party is helped or harmed more by compact districts, they con
tend, this is a "purely fortuitous result"; it should not detract from
the worthy goal of "fairer" districting.1 62 This criticism, however,
essentially begs its own question. It assumes that when the two
conflict, compactness is a "fairer" districting criterion than, for in
stance, proportional representation. But some notion of propor
tional representation is precisely the concern that underlies
gerrymandering's purported illegitimacy. Thus, if compactness
helps to defeat the very principle of equal representation it is
designed to vindicate, it must be subordinated to broader goals of
the political process. While some of the plans at issue in Shaw cases
are substantially Democratically gerrymandered beyond propor
tional representation, the need for federal courts to respect states'
distributions of political power - rather than imposing their own
preferable distributions through norms like compactness - prevails
nonetheless. If courts want to take on partisan gerrymanders, Shaw
remedies are not the place; courts should do so only under a direct
doctrine that scrutinizes and punishes both parties to the same
degree.163
As a final matter, some may question the ability of courts to
preserve the partisan balance enacted by a state legislature.164 To
be sure, districting has become a very sophisticated enterprise. Yet

160. See supra text accompanying note 46 (noting that Texas's and North Carolina's plans
had passed partisan gerrymandering challenges).
161. See, e.g., Polsby & Popper, supra note 5, at 336.
162. See Shapiro, supra note 154, at 240, quoted in Polsby & Popper, supra note 5, at 336.
Specifically, Professor Shapiro maintains that the result is fortuitous because it is "unforesee
able by either party when it chose its ideologies and clienteles." Shapiro, supra note 154, at
240. Yet such a claim seems debatable at best. In America's primarily two-party system, the
competing political parties are constantly refashioning their messages to appeal to constitu
encies in order to produce the most effective results for the party. Does Professor Shapiro
really think that the dispersion of "swing" voters in districts escapes the parties' notice?
163. See infra section III.B (presenting this alternative).
164. See MARK E. RusH, DoES REDISTRICTING MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 54, 135-36 (1993)
(questioning legislators' ability to enact effective partisan gerrymanders because people fre
quently switch political parties and actually vote for individuals, not parties). This claim,
however, seems to overstate the argument; surely certain plans are more beneficial to partic
ular parties than others. In fact, modem technology allows drafters of districts to see imme
diately the partisan makeup, based on recent election returns, of any proposed district. See
Issacharoff, supra note 115, at 1259 (noting that today the partisan consequences of redistrict
ing plans are "fully predictable"); supra note 5 (noting technological advances). These num
bers generally hold true over short time spans. To give just one example, Democratic
congressmen in Texas alerted the district court to the fact that, based on 1994 statewide elec
tion returns, the court's remedial plan shifted the partisan balance in District 5 from slightly
Democratic to 53% Republican. See Texas Stay Application, supra note 26, at 22-23. In the
1996 congressional election between two first-time candidates, Republican Pete Sessions
took over District 5 with 53% of the vote. See Results of Contests, supra note 26, at B19.
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difficulties in redistricting should not relieve courts of their duty to
try to respect state policies. Insofar as a federal court attempts to
respect state policies, the court's plan can only gain legitimacy. Fur
thermore, courts generally do not draft redistricting plans from
scratch. Parties and amici in the litigation normally provide courts
with several remedial plans from which to choose. The parties to
the litigation are typically intimately familiar with the partisan im
plications of different plans, and are sure to alert courts of any ad
justments to the state's political landscape caused by proposed
plans. 165 In many instances, then, courts need only follow the dic
tates of Weiser and Upham and choose the least politically disrup
tive plan. 166 When faced with more difficult choices, and when
specific state policy cannot be discerned from the plans or their leg
islative history, courts should use their equitable discretion to strive
to avoid favoring any political group more than did the original
plan. In the end, though, federal courts do not have to balance
every state policy; the state has already done that. Courts must sim
ply follow the original lines to the greatest extent possible while
striving to avoid moving incumbents or creating any decisive parti
san shifts. 167
III.

CouRTs

POLITICS:
THICKET?

WEIGHING

Too DEEP

INTO THE

Requiring courts to take notice of political considerations may
strike one as rather unsavory. Indeed, ever since the Supreme
Court's entry into the business of redistricting, the Court itself has
been justifiably wary of becoming hopelessly entangled in the
"political thicket. "168 As Professor Jo Desha Lucas suggested in the
wake of Baker v. Carr,169 "[c]ourts are themselves frequently in
need of protection from partisan politics, and for this reason tradi
tionally they have kept out of partisan struggles. "170 Thus, the
165. This is exactly what the parties did in Texas, but the district court claimed that it
refused to look at the evidence. See Vera v. Bush, 933 F. Supp. 1341, 1351 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
166. See supra'section II.A.
167. Before moving on, it is worth mentioning that if a federal court is remedying a state
legislative (rather than congressional) district's Shaw violation, preserving incumbency pro·
tection and the partisan balance should hold even more weight. Under this scenario, even if
the federal court distorted the importance of other state policies, so long as the court pre
served the state's political balance, the legislature, composed of essentially the same interests,
could simply correct the federal court's mistakes. If, however, the federal court altered the
political balance of the state, it would be far more difficult to avoid a more significant intru·
sion and effect on state policy.
168. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (coin
ing the term "political thicket").
169. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
170. Jo Desha Lucas, Legislative Apportionment and Representative Government: The
Meaning of Baker v. Carr, 61 MICH. L. REV. 711, 802 (1963).
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Court has acted carefully to investigate and to weigh political
choices of state legislatures only when necessary to vindicate voters'
right to fair and equal access to the political process.
This Part contends, however, that this precise principle of avoid
ing excessive entanglement in legislative and political business
counsels in favor of courts taking notice of and respecting states'
political choices when remedying Shaw violations. Only by affirma
tively striving to leave states' permissible political choices intact can
federal courts avoid being perceived as unjustifiably meddling in
states' legitimate management of their own political affairs. Section
III.A examines the appropriateness and institutional competency of
federal courts to weigh overtly political considerations, and con
cludes that, while this practice is far from entirely satisfying, it is the ,
most acceptable course to pursue under the Court's current doc
trine. Insofar as this solution still proves unpalatable, however, sec
tion III.B quickly presents the most viable alternative: fortifying
the partisan gerrymandering doctrine, thereby allowing courts to
treat some Shaw violations as partisan gerrymandering violations.
A.

Institutional Concerns

The institutional concerns over federal courts taking notice of,
respecting, and replicating states' political choices in redistricting
legislation fall into roughly two categories: (1) whether such a prac
tice would provide undeserved legitimacy to often self-serving polit
ical compromises; and (2) whether such a practice would represent
an unwarranted entry into the territory of "political questions."
1.

The Legitimizing Power of Courts

Federal courts, and, in particular, the Supreme Court, hold a
special place in American society. As Professor Charles Black ex
plained, the significance of judicial review goes far beyond mere
checks and balances; judicial review also helps to assure the public
of the validity of governmental actions.171 By sanctioning govern
mental actions in constitutional terms, the Supreme Court, through
the virtue it symbolizes, lends legitimacy to such actions in a way
that no other institution can.172 Yet this legitimizing function de
pends heavily on public confidence in the Court as an apolitical in
stitution: "If the public should ever become convinced that the
171. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JumcrAL REVIEW IN A
(1960).
172. See id. at 64-65; see also Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 15 HARV. L. REv. 40, 48 (1961) ("The Court's prestige, the
spell it casts as a symbol, enable it to entrench and solidify measures that may have been
DEMOCRACY 59-86

tentative in conception or that are on the verge of abandonment in the execution. The Court,
regardless of what it intends, can generate consent and may impart permanence.").
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Court is merely another legislature, that judicial review is only a
euphemism for an additional layer in the legislative process, the
Court's future as a constitutional tribunal would be cast in grave
doubt."173 Hence, the danger becomes apparent: requiring courts
to take notice of, and expressly to consider, political consequences
of redistricting plans may make states' political gerrymandering and
incumbency protection seem legitimate, instead of merely not
unconstitutional.
There undoubtedly exists a degree of difference between al
lowing nakedly political policies because they fail to violate a fed
eral right and actively seeking to preserve them in a redistricting
remedy. By refusing to strike down severe partisan gerrymanders,
for example, the Court does offer a certain measure of (perhaps
undeserved) legitimacy to that practice; yet the Court's level of
complicity is undeniably higher when it expressly preserves such a
situation. Is this slight increase in perceived accountability enough
to turn the tables?
Before one condemns active preservation, one should inspect its
alternative. The alternative to taking notice of and respecting
states' political choices in crafting Shaw remedies is to require
courts to blind themselves - assuming that is possible - to the
political consequences of their remedial plans. But, as detailed
above, blindness cannot avoid the inevitability of political conse
quences in redistricting.174 If anything, blindness can only exacer
bate political consequences and sacrifice the very neutrality that
courts seek to represent by increasing significantly the likelihood
that the political consequences of courts' plans will benefit one side,
the Republicans, disproportionately - all while the harm that
courts are purporting to cure has nothing to do with any message
sent by, or any effect resulting from, states' partisan considerations.
There is no perfect answer to this quandary, but the better solu
tion is clear. Though it may seem ironic, the best way for federal
courts to stay out of the political thicket is for courts actively to
strive to preserve states' political considerations when, as in Shaw
violations, those considerations are not implicated in the harm they
173. Robert G. McCloskey, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term - Foreword: The Reappor
tionment Case, 16 HARV. L. REV. 54, 67 (1962); cf. Schuck, supra note 5, at 1383-84 (noting

that "the Court's prestige seems to be burnished" in the public eye when it challenges politi
cians' self-interest). Phrased in Professor Schuck's tenns, then, the Court must be wary of
appearing to aid politicians in pursuit of their own self-interest.
174. As the Court itself said in Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973): "[I]t
requires no special genius to recognize the political consequences of drawing a district line
along one street rather than another. It is not only obvious, but absolutely unavoidable, that
the location and shape of districts may well determine the political complexion of the area."
See also supra text accompanying notes 110-15, 154-59; cf. RusH, Freewill, on PERMANENT
WAVES (PolyGram Records, Inc. 1980) ("If you choose not to decide, you still have made a
choice.").
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are remedying. In other words, when federal courts refuse to dis
turb the political compromises of a state, they more effectively "ig
nore" politics than when they alter - even blindly alter - a state's
political landscape. 11s
Federal courts should admit forthrightly that redistricting inevi
tably has political consequences, and that because this is so, they, as
the apolitical branch of government, have the duty to defer to a
state's political policies in that practice. While this action back
handedly may lend some legitimacy to somewhat distasteful state
politics, it will safeguard public respect for a federal judiciary that
refuses unnecessarily to become involved in political squabbles.176
So long as the Court allows states to pursue political objectives
through redistricting, the tenets of federalism and separation of
powers necessarily trump any institutional argument - no matter
how queasy it makes us - and require that federal courts defer to
all state policies that are not part of any constitutional violation.
Because Shaw violations fail to implicate the partisan consequences
of states' political redistricting policies, federal courts must strive to
leave them intact.

175. Federal courts thereby follow the dictates of Wise v. Lipscomb, which emphasized
that federal courts remedying redistricting violations, " 'lacking the political authoritativeness
that the legislature can bring to the task,' must act 'circumspectly, and in a manner "free from
any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination." ' " 437 U.S. 535, 541 {1978) (plurality opinion)
(quoting Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977) (quoting Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695,
710 (1964))).
Such a practice raises a related concern: if the thrust of Shaw's expressive harm lies in
districts' uncouth appearances, see supra note 86 and accompanying text, one might argue
that public confidence in federal courts would be undermined if courts altered only a few
offending racial lines and submitted as a remedy an equally bizarre-looking district. It is true
that respecting states' political compromises may result in remedial districts that appear al
most as bizarrely shaped as their predecessors. But while these results may not be perfectly
desirable, they cannot be avoided.
First, it should be reiterated that a significant strain in the Court's opinions suggests that
Shaw's harm is not dependent on the shape of a district. See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct.
2475, 2486 (1995) (holding that intent, not shape, creates a violation); supra subsection I.B.2
(emphasizing that racial classification is Shaw's harm). Indeed, in the Texas case, the district
court, without challenge from the Supreme Court, upheld several districts that were as bi
zarrely shaped as the ones it struck down because those districts allegedly failed to employ
racial classifications. See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1965-67, 1994-96 {1996) {displaying
those districts). Furthermore, under White v. Weiser, a district court is bound to reject a
remedial plan with more compact districts if another plan fully cures the constitutional viola
tion while being more true to the state's political redistricting policies. See 412 U.S. 783, 79396 (1973). Finally, even if their remedial districts are also oddly shaped, federal courts will
garner some measure of legitimacy from residents of states who see that the courts refused to
reach beyond their institutional bounds.
176. In so doing, federal courts will retain their "indispensable intellectual disinterested
ness . . . in [apportionment] matters." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 268 (1962) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting). This is no small matter. Such a practice could help avoid accusations of bias
like those that occurred in the Texas redistricting case. In that case, local Democrats com
plained vehemently when the three judges on the district court, all appointed by Republican
presidents, drafted a plan that heavily favored Republicans. See Wendy Benjaminson, Legis
lators Seeking Redistricting Delay I Panel Asked to Wait on High Court Ruling, HousTON
Om.ON., Aug. 15, 1996, at Al.
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Avoiding "Political Questions"

At first blush, considering political choices in redistricting ap
pears to tread dangerously close to passing judgment on a political
question, something the Court has declined to do since its incep
tion.177 When federal courts actively consider states' political com
promises in the arena of redistricting, which is itself extraordinarily
political, one might argue that federal courts enter a territory best
left to the political branches of government. Without a doubt, ap
portioning political power is the job of state legislatures. But in the
case of Shaw remedies, states have already constitutionally appor
tioned that power; this Note asks federal courts only to preserve
those choices. Thus, as a closer inspection of the political-question
doctrine reveals, federal courts curing Shaw violations actually act
in accordance with the policy of the political-question doctrine by
refusing to alter legitimate political compromises that they lack the
constitutional authority to modify.178
In the words of Justice Brennan in Baker, "the mere fact that [a]
suit seeks protection of a political right does not mean it presents a
political question. Such an objection 'is little more than a play upon
words.' "179 This is all the more true in the case of a remedy
that
is, when a suit does not involve a "political right" in the first place,
but when a state now seeks protection of its political rights in curing
an unrelated unconstitutional racial classification.
At bottom, the political-question doctrine is really a tenet of ju
dicial self-restraint,180 The crux of the political question doctrine
counsels federal courts to avoid meddling in questions thought to
be inappropriate for judicial control181 - questions, again to quote
Justice Brennan, "impossib[le] [to decide] without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [ ] im
possib[le] [to undertake] independent resolution without expressing
[a] lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government."182
-

177. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 {1803); see also Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 210-17 {1962); 369 U.S. at 289 {1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Luther v.
Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 39-47 {1849); McCloskey, supra note 173, at 59-61.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 135-38.
179. Baker, 369 U.S. at 209 (quoting Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 {1927)); see also
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 292 (4th ed. 1996) {"The mere fact that a case has political stakes or has
generated political controversy clearly does not render it nonjusticiable under the political
question doctrine.").
180. See Bickel, supra note 172, at 51-58; McCloskey, supra note 173, at 64.
181. See McCloskey, supra note 173, at 64; Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles
of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1959) (maintaining that courts regard political
questions as ones that "are not to be resolved judicially, although they . . . arise in the course
of litigation").
182. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. Other traditional concerns of the political-question doctrine,
namely, the need for judicially manageable standards, see 369 U.S. at 217, and the desire to
prevent excessive litigation that strips state legislatures of their redistricting function, see City
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Above all else, federal courts should refrain from meddling in parti
san struggles within the political branches of state governments ab
sent a showing that those branches have unconstitutionally
allocated power or benefits in the first place.183
This requirement of self-restraint describes exactly the situation
posed in Shaw remedies. Federal courts are asked to modify a re
districting plan which unconstitutionally classifies voters on the ba
sis of race, but which is difficult to adjust without treading on
political considerations inappropriate for judicial control. This is
quite a thorny problem. But in order to make any progress toward
an acceptable solution, it is crucial to recognize that, no matter
what federal courts say or do, the problem cannot be escaped. Fed
eral courts cannot avoid altering states' legitimate political choices
by refusing to consider them; creating political consequences from
moving lines on a redistricting plan is nearly inevitable.184 That be
ing the case, it seems far better to require courts to confront the
problem with their eyes open. Only by purposefully seeking to re
spect political considerations that - in the context of discrete racial
gerrymandering violations - must be deemed legitimate may fed
eral courts truly attempt to avoid affecting political choices properly
left to the political branches of state government.
B.

The Viable Alternative: Reconsider Bandemer

The predicament in which the Court has placed itself is now
clear: in remedying racial gerrymandering violations, it should con
sider and respect political choices made by state legislatures, re
gardless of their potentially partisan flavor. But if this seems too
unsavory or untidy for the Court, there is one viable alternative: it
could reconsider Bandemer's partisan-gerrymandering doctrine and
put some teeth into it. Such reconsideration would allow federal
courts to deal with states' self-serving political choices head-on and
properly to adjust extreme partisan aspects of states' redistricting
plans under partisan vote-dilution challenges, rather than inadver
tently and improperly doing so under Shaw racial classification
challenges.

of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 90-92 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring), are much less rele
vant here. Regarding the former, federal courts encounter this issue only when balancing the
equities in the remedial phase of Shaw cases, so ironclad standards need not exist. Certainly,
no specific standards for compactness, contiguity, respecting political subdivisions, or pre
serving communities of interest exist, and federal courts always weigh each of these factors
when drawing remedial plans. Regarding the latter, the restriction of this issue to the reme
dial phase of cases will greatly restrict the spawning of new litigation. Moreover, because
federal courts are required to defer to legislative redistricting remedies, see supra text accom
panying notes 95-96, the frequency of appeals will be lesser still.
183. This remains true even when a federal court seeks to replace a state's politically self
serving policy with what it deems a "fairer" policy. See supra text accompanying note 97.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12.
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It would be fine, and perhaps even desirable,18s if the Court de
cided to strengthen its partisan gerrymandering doctrine in order to
modify political consequences of redistricting plans when they de
prive citizens of their right to affect electoral outcomes; it just
should not take that action, or allow lower courts to take that ac
tion, under the Shaw doctrine.186 If the Court is so uncomfortable
with the prospect of.legitimizing states' nakedly political redistrict
ing objectives, perhaps it should revamp the doctrine that purports
to constrain these practices. Indeed, the public may applaud such
an increased check on its elected officials.187 But, in the meantime,
when federal courts alter these political practices under the guise of
remedying Shaw violations - and especially when they alter them
largely in favor of one political party - the judiciary abandons the
very legitimacy and neutrality it seeks to represent.188

CONCLUSION

Shaw litigation is entering a critical phase. Now that federal
courts are beginning to implement racial gerrymandering remedies
- the Supreme Court heard its first two such appeals this Termt89
185. Justice Stevens, joined by several commentators, has advocated this approach. See
Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1975 n.2, 1987-92 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Issacharoff &
Pildes, supra note 54, at 25; see also Polsby & Popper, supra note 5, at 303-16 (providing a
persuasive argument against allowing partisan gerrymanders).
While an extended discussion of the desirability of strengthening Bandemer is beyond the
scope of this Note, it is important to note that doing so might well allow the Court to deal
more effectively with "mixed motive" cases like Bush and Shaw II. In these cases, racial
boundaries may often be seen as merely a side-effect (or an ancillary outcome) - but not an
antecedent - to political considerations and attempts to comply with the Voting Rights Act,
both of which the Court has recognized as legitimate districting policies. See supra notes 9,
107, 116 and accompanying text. Indeed, as Professor Rush has pointed out, because racial
minorities vote overwhelmingly Democratic, and because they tend to remain in specific geo
graphic locales, see RusH, supra note 164, at 126-29, what - after the fact - appears to be
racial gerrymandering is often actually political gerrymandering. By addressing these gerry
manders under a nonracial doctrine, the Court could refute current concerns that Shaw pun
ishes only Democratic and pro-minority gerrymanders while permitting equally egregious
Republican gerrymanders to avoid serious constitutional scrutiny. Strengthening Bandemer
also would avoid Shaw's effect of applying compactness criteria only to majority-minority
districts, see Pildes, supra note 5, something that, while perhaps justifiable under the expres
sive harm doctrine, nevertheless appears somewhat inequitable.
186. Some scholars have argued that the Court's malapportionment doctrine also was
largely an attempt to constrain partisan gerrymandering. See Alfange, supra note 51, at 177,
201-03; Lucas, supra note 170, at 801 (noting that partisan political struggles are just beneath
the surface of apportionment cases). But, as the fallout from those decisions has demon
strated, indirect doctrines of dealing with partisan gerrymandering are insufficient. See, e.g.,
Pildes, supra note 5.
187. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
188. Cf. Wechsler, supra note 181, at 15-19 (arguing that courts should judge only by
"neutral principles").
189. See Abrams v. Johnson, 116 S. Ct. 1823 (1996) (noting probable jurisdiction); Law
yer v. Department of Justice, 117 S. Ct. 292 (1996) (same). According to one commentator,
the issues in Abrams focused on the lower court's application of the Voting Rights Act to its
redistricting remedy. After striking down a plan with three majority-minority districts, the
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- they must be reminded to adhere carefully to the narrow scope
of Shaw's reach. The Shaw doctrine is designed to constrain "short
sighted and unauthorized"190 racial classifications in redistricting
plans; it is not designed to address the apportionment of political
power throughout states. But allowing federal courts, in remedying
Shaw violations, to ignore permissible political consi�e:rations that
form the core of states' redistricting plans threatens to make the
stakes of Shaw cases inexorably higher.
Because the Court's partisan-gerrymandering doctrine makes it
exceedingly difficult to attack redistricting plans on political
grounds,191 political parties and interest groups are gaining an in
centive to couch partisan grievances in racial terms.192 Absent a
requirement that federal courts remedying Shaw violations strive to
leave states' political compromises intact, federal courts seriously
risk providing such groups with political gains they were unable to
achieve through valid state legislative processes or at the polls.
Such overreaching by federal courts is difficult, if not impossible, to
square with our basic principles of federalism and separation of
powers.
Thus, as the Court's doctrine currently stands, federal courts
remedying Shaw violations have no choice but to take notice of and
respect states' political policies - even if they appear colored with
self-interest - so long as the policies fail to violate any constitu
tional norms. If this proves too unsavory to the Court, it should
reconsider its position on partisan gerrymandering and deal forth
rightly with the problem of partisan vote-dilution. But whatever
the Court's ultimate answer, the current practice of self-imposed
blindness in crafting Shaw remedies is an escape hatch that leads
district court included only one majority-minority district in its remedial plan. Appellants
argued that the Voting Rights Act required the court to create a second such district. See
Linda Greenhouse, Lower Courts Become Issue in Redistricting, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1996,
at AlO (recounting oral argument). The Lawyer appeal focused on whether a remedial plan
accepted by the district court itself violated Shaw and, perhaps more importantly, whether
the district court's use of mediation in the settlement process violated principles of federal
ism, or the separation of powers. See 65 U.S.L.W. 3282 (listing questions presented). There
fore, it appears unlikely that the Supreme Court's opinion in either case will tackle the issues
central to this Note.
190. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2494 '{1995).
191. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132-33, 139 (1986) (plurality opinion);
Badham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664, 667-72 (N.D. Cal. 1988), summarily affd., 488 U.S. 1024
(1989); supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
192. See Karlan, supra note 7, at 251; see also Charles Fried, The Supreme Court, 1994
Term - Forward: Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REv. 13, 66 n.355 {1995). The recent challenge
to New York's 1\velfth District, for example, was brought by Angel Diaz, the district's Re
publican candidate in the 1992 congressional election, after she lost the election. See Diaz v.
Silver, No. CIV.A.95-CV-2591 1997 WL 94175, at *l (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1997) (per curiam).
Suits like this lend credence to the popular notion that many Shaw cases are not about race at
all, but rather are "vehicle suits" aimed at increasing partisan representation. See Karlan,
supra note 19, at 1727-30; Pildes, supra note 54, at 1378-80.
,
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only to less judicially legitimate and more politically disruptive rem
edies. It should not be tolerated.

